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Throughout time, powerful women have been perceived as threats to systems of 
masculine control. These women have been deemed UnWomen—other than what 
Woman should be—and are read, throughout literature, as the archetypal, monstrous 
femme fatale. This UnWoman embodies Kristeva’s abject and Freud’s uncanny, being 
perceived by her culture as generally monstrous. When this type of woman is read from 
the Game Theory perspective, the monstrous woman—disturbing to masculine power 
structure and veiled in the uncanny—often fulfills the role of game-master. Within the 
theoretical structure of the godgame, specifically, the game-maker (and primary game-
master) are similarly veiled within a type of “undecidability.” When the reader ventures 
to explore beyond the archetypal label of femme fatale, the characters who have often 
been designated to this flat role prove to possess more controlling power than is typically 
considered. 
This thesis employs a combination of feminist, queer, and game theoretical 
readings to explore five of these women: Morgan la Faye and the Lady of Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight, the Eve of Paradise Lost, and Westworld’s Dolores and Maeve. 
Using this type of theoretical approach, each of these women prove to possess significant, 
though often veiled, controlling power over their respective gamespaces, making them 
into, not mere femme fatales, but rather autonomous and complex game-masters who 
work to dismantle and control the game’s male-dominated power structure. 
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This thesis explores the ways in which the powerful roles of game-maker and 
game-master within literature are transformed when assumed by women. In taking on 
these governing roles, feminine figures across genres are viewed as legitimate threats to 
masculine controlling power as they are able to rise out of their positions as pawns of the 
godgames in which they have been entrapped and achieve controlling power through the 
role of game-master. When these women gain authority over the gamespaces which 
previously oppressed them, they gain the ability to create labyrinths of doubt and 
perplexity which, purposely or not, emasculate the men who would otherwise hold this 
traditionally “masculine” power of game manipulation. In threatening the power of 
masculinity, these feminine figures endanger not only the positions of individual men, but 
the entirety of the patriarchal power structure as well. In taking on the role of game-
master and enacting god-like controlling power over male characters, the woman is no 
longer strictly “woman.” In stepping outside of the realm of “what women should be,” 
she has moved into the realm of Kristeva’s abject and Freud’s uncanny, or, to combine 
the two, the monstrous UnWoman (Grant 65). 
Kate Salen and Eric Zimmerman, in their book Rules of Play: Game Design 
Fundamentals, consolidate multiple game theorists’ definitions of “game,” producing the 
following: “A game is a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined 
by rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome” (7.11). These games are created by what 
Salen and Zimmerman refer to as “game designers,” but that will be referred to here as 




which meaningful play emerges” (7.11). While these authors’ conception of a game 
designer refers primarily to the creator “of games, from computer and video games to 
parlor games and sports,” when applied to literature, game-masters are identified not only 
as the author (or maker) of the text, but as the characters themselves (Salen & 
Zimmerman 7.11).1 While the game-maker crafts the game, the game-master, as the name 
suggests, is the entity in current possession of controlling power. Though the game-maker 
and -master are sometimes one in the same, this is not the case when manipulative 
hierarchies are introduced into a text. These hierarchies are an essential aspect of what 
Tison Pugh names the “godgame.” Pugh writes: 
A godgame occurs in literature when one or more characters creates an 
illusion, a mazelike sequence of false accounts, that entraps another 
character. The entrapped character finds himself entangled in the threads 
of (from his point of view) an incomprehensible strategy plotted by 
another character who (thus) takes on the roles both of a game-maker, 
since he invents rules for the other character to follow, and of a god as 
well. (Pugh 526-27) 
It is this god-like power of entrapment over male game players that makes the female 
dangerous. Though she is not necessarily a villain, the female is made monstrous by her 
uncanny ability to manipulate a game situation beyond the detection of other—
specifically male—game players (Pugh 527). 
 
1 While this thesis will explore the game-masters within literature, there are certainly legitimate 
metaphysical readings of these texts which pay special attention to the role of the author as game-




Freud’s Das Unheimlich attempts to define this term that undoubtedly “evokes 
fear and dread,” but is too complex to be “used in a clearly definable sense” (123). Das 
Unheimlich, or “the uncanny,” serves as the foundational concept of the term 
“monstrosity” as it will be used in this context. Freud turns to other languages’ 
definitions of unheimlich in order to gain a fuller understanding of “this particular species 
of the frightening” (125). The base word, “heimlich,” he defines as “homely” only to later 
discover that its antonym “unheimlich” is not necessarily an antonym at all (Freud 132). 
Both terms can refer to “what is concealed and kept hidden,” the difference being in the 
degree of comfort produced by that which is concealed (132). To differentiate, Freud 
turns to Friedrich Schelling’s understanding of unheimlich: “Uncanny is what one calls 
everything that was meant to remain secret and hidden and has come into the open” (qtd. 
in Freud 132). It is because this veiled quality that the game-master can be presented as 
both comforting and frightening that Schelling’s definition of the uncanny is crucial to 
consider alongside the presence of female game-masters. The uncanny also plays on the 
individual’s sense of security. Freud begins Das Unheimlich by describing the uncanny 
as that which “evokes fear and dread,” and Elisabeth Bronfen recognizes this fear and 
dread as “anxieties about fragmentation [and] the disruption or destruction of any 
narcissistically informed sense of personal stability, bodily integrity, immortal 
individuality” (Freud 123, Bronfen 113). If the game-master of a godgame is inherently 
uncanny in her indiscernibility in game players’ perceptions, the eventual revelation of 
her power initiates the narcissistic anxieties that Bronfen discusses. The uncanny game-
master is therefore a threat to both the societal structure and the individual’s personal 




When looking broadly at what makes a monster, one is often pointed in the 
direction of Julia Kristeva’s abject. Freud writes that unheimlich is often simultaneously 
heimlich, and therefore what is uncanny is often both familiar and unfamiliar (132). In 
order to be classified as unheimlich, a thing often must also, by definition, be heimlich. 
The necessary quality of the uncanny as existing concurrently within seemingly opposing 
categories of experience points to Kristeva’s concept of abjection. Similar to the uncanny, 
the abject is difficult to ascribe a concrete definition to as it exists outside of binaries and 
is often defined by what it is not. Kristeva writes that the “abject has only one quality of 
the object–that of being opposed to I,” and in searching for any further meaning it draws 
one “toward the place where meaning collapses” (1-2). The abject, in its separation from 
“I”, becomes a violent and disgusting Other. At the same time, because the abject breaks 
the boundaries of binary systems, the line between “I” and “Other” becomes blurred. 
Both culture and literature set the laws and boundaries that ought not be broken, and in 
the dissipation of culturally accepted boundaries and imposition of liminality, the abject 
exists within the ambiguous. Elizabeth Grosz essentially defines the “freak” as an 
embodiment of the abject, writing in Intolerable Ambiguity: Freaks as/at the Limit:  
[T]he freak is an ambiguous being whose existence imperils categories 
and oppositions dominant in social life. Freaks are those human beings 
who exist outside and in defiance of the structure of binary oppositions 
that govern our basic concepts and modes of self-definition… They 
imperil the very definitions we rely on to classify humans, identities, and 
sexes—our most fundamental categories of self-definition and boundaries 




Grosz’s freak is a human who exists within the realm of monstrosities and occupies “the 
impossible middle ground between oppositions” (57). The clear overlap of these three 
concepts (Freud’s uncanny, Kristeva’s abject, and Grosz’s freak) reflects the prevailing 
societal attempt to understand the ambiguous other.2 As society consistently attempts to 
solidify what constitutes as the monstrous, the fear that ambiguity produces within 
humanity becomes the defining factor of monstrosity. As Kristeva’s abject, Freud’s 
uncanny, and Grosz’s freak attempt to pinpoint the characteristics which create 
discomfort, their definitions blur into one and the monster’s cornerstone becomes clear: 
the threat of the unfamiliar to societal systems of order.  
While the horror generated by “female monsters [is] usually related to either their 
reproductive functions or their maternal role,” this concept is complicated when situated 
within a godgame (Grafius 38). When the female takes on a masculine role, thereby 
personifying the monstrous, abject unheimlich, she is no longer viewed as simply 
“female,” and she begins to move, instead, toward the realm of the UnWoman.3 In 
 
2 As this thesis deals specifically with the freakish female, Grosz’s statement that the freak 
imperils “the very definitions we rely on to classify humans, identities, and sexes” will become 
very important, especially in its relation to the concept of the UnWoman as discussed in the final 
chapter. 
3 In her Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Julia Kristeva writes, “The capable woman, 
the intellectual, does not escape being grotesque either … she is fated to prove the absurdity of 
reason (a masculine element) when it is sheltered in a body that is feminine to boot” (169). If the 
masculine woman is made grotesque by stepping outside of the realm of what a woman “should 
be,” a clear line can be drawn between Butler’s concepts of gender-bending and abjection 
(Grant). Within the realm of dualistic thought, libido is considered masculine, making 
femininity’s defining trait “the denial of that libido, the ‘dissimulation of a fundamental 
masculinity’” (Gender Trouble 68). Femininity, therefore, is simply the act of mimicking what is 
considered the opposite of the masculine. When the woman instead takes on masculine roles, she 
becomes the grotesque/monstrous gender-bender. It is only when gender is understood as 
performative that the masculine woman is not perceived as an embodiment of monstrosity 




assuming the role of game-master, the female is removed from her connection with 
“reproductive functions [and] maternal roles” and instead comes to be associated with the 
danger of abstruse abjection (38). While the female’s position of power in and of itself 
grants her a capacity for danger, the inability of the surrounding society to categorize her 
as either a feminine woman or a masculine man exponentializes her threat to androcentric 
power systems. In her book Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 
Judith Butler discusses the concept of “intelligible genders” and this frailty of a socially 
constructed gender identity (xxiii). She writes that when individuals’ expressions of 
sexuality coincide with cultural conceptions of binary gender, they are accepted as 
people, while those “who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility 
by which persons are defined” are stripped of assured identity (Butler 23). Consequently, 
as a female takes on the role of what is traditionally considered to be masculine, both 
personal and cultural perceptions of identity begin to deteriorate, as does the gender 
binary itself. Citing Michel Foucault, Butler also writes, “The binary regulation of 
sexuality suppresses the subversive multiplicity of sexuality that disrupts heterosexual, 
reproductive, and mediojuridical hegemonies” (26). In the assumption of masculine 
controlling power through her role as gamemaster, the female disrupts the entirety of 
traditionally expected gender expression by revealing the “multiplicity of sexuality” that 
cannot be controlled by culturally imposed gender categories. In her inability to be 
categorized, the masculine female comes to epitomize the abject, and in her 
personification of the ambiguity she is made monstrous. 
This thesis’ second chapter explores the multi-layered godgame of Sir Gawain 




power of the Green Knight, a reading of this text through a lens of game theory reveals 
the orchestrator of events to be the goddess Morgan la Faye. The Green Knight possesses 
no real power but is rather, unbeknownst to him, under the control of the poem’s game-
maker. Despite her centrality to the storyline, Morgan remains on the periphery of the 
text, controlling events from outside of the players’ perception. Morgan’s ability to 
manipulate Gawain’s experience grants her the roles of both game-master and 
omnipotent god, and she therefore possesses a far greater capacity for danger than the 
Green Knight to whom she grants very limited power. While Morgan constructs the 
gamespace and serves as the game-master of the outermost game of the text, there is a 
game-master who works more intimately with the victims of Morgan’s godgame. The 
Lady, while often written off by critics as nothing but an archetypal sexual temptation, 
serves as game-master of the bedroom—the centermost game of the text. The Lady has 
her own clearly marked gamespace over which she has dominion. While Morgan is the 
game-maker and primary game-master, she delegates power to the Lady to serve as a 
game-master of a space that ultimately brings about the downfall of the Arthurian court.  
Although the Lady is far from a sexual archetype, she certainly plays the part of 
the archetype well—leading Gawain to believe that her intentions do not extend beyond 
sexual desire. In reality, the Lady only “let lyk as hym loued mych” (pretends to love 
him) in order to achieve her true goal of fonde (SGGK lines 1280-89).4 The Bedroom 
 
4 fō̆nden, -ien (v.) Also vond(i)en, fanden, faunden. Ppl. i-)fō̆nded, fonde, fonte. 1. (a) To put (a 
person, his strength, skill, etc.) to a test or trial; to try the worth of; also, to prove (a person) 
worthy by trial; (b) to make trial (of a person's or animal's strength); (c) to put (God) on trial; to 
tempt (God); to try the patience (of God). 2. To subject (a person) to trial by tempting him with 
sin; to tempt to evil;-- (a) with obj.; (b) with to phrase; (c) absol. 
To subject (a person) to trial by tempting him with sin; to tempt to evil;-- (a) with obj.; (b) with to 




Game is situated at the nucleus of the text, therefore acting as the center of the labyrinth 
Morgan is continually fashioning. Just as Ovid’s Minotaur dwells in the center of the 
labyrinth, the Lady waits within the private, feminine spaces of Hautdesert, prepared to 
appeal to Gawain’s weaknesses within a gamespace which he cannot easily escape. When 
Gawain enters into Hautdesert, he unknowingly enters into a “world of women,” and is 
consequently transplanted from his status as Marian knight to that of emasculated guest 
(Fisher 77). Not only are the Lady’s true intentions hidden from the player in her 
gamespace, but the fulfillment of her purpose as a game-master demands the submission 
of the knight who should be the epitome of Marian masculinity. The Lady therefore 
matches Morgan la Faye in the monstrous feminine. Where Morgan exists in the 
monstrous feminine as vetula5, the Lady exists as janua diaboli6. Although Morgan is the 
grand orchestrator of events within the narrative, the Lady uses the cultural conceptions 
of the role of the female as a weapon in the downfall of both Gawain and the entirety of 
the Arthurian court—attacking both the individual’s masculinity and that of the grander 
social structure.  
As is proven in the third chapter, the idea of a woman’s sexuality as “the greatest 
of all obstacles in the way of salvation” is not one specific to the Lady of SGGK or to the 
literature of the Middle Ages, but one that finds its genesis in creation mythology (Power 
35). When considering the concept of a godgame alongside monstrous femininity, it is 
practical to look at Milton’s account of the original godgame: the Garden of Eden. The 
heterotopia of the Garden of Eden in both biblical creation mythology and Milton’s 
 
5 See Sarah Miller, page 3. 




account of the Fall of Man in Paradise Lost is disrupted by the disobedience of the first 
woman, Eve.7 It is traditionally understood that Eve’s departure from her husband leaves 
her vulnerable to the deception of Satan and the temptations of sin to which her female 
status makes her prone. This concept comes not from Milton, but from Genesis, and is 
heavily dependent on the reading of the first woman as being created as a “help meet” for 
Adam. However, Pamela Norris writes, in her book Eve: A Biography, that the true 
meaning of this crucial passage may very well have gotten lost in translation. This 
Hebrew phrase ‘ēzer kenegdô, Norris says, would better be translated as “‘a companion 
corresponding to’ Adam, in other words a being of the same status, and the rib story 
confirms that Eve is part of Adam and therefore cannot be inferior to him” (19-20). If the 
Eve of Milton is naturally subject to the commands of her husband due to an innate 
inferior status, then her manipulation of Adam in order to achieve true autonomy outside 
of the boundaries of the Garden would be wholly unnatural and villainous. However, 
with Norris’ alternate translation in mind, Eve is better defined as a game-master of Eden, 
manipulating her appointed husband when necessary in order to achieve independence. 
Both Adam’s contentment in Eden and lack of desire for freedom present as hindrances 
to Eve’s achievement of true personhood and “intellectual food,” and his unrequited 
devotion to his wife grants Eve the opportunity to take on the masculine position of 
control within the relationship (Milton IX.768). If Eve is understood as Adam’s equal, a 
reading of Paradise Lost through a Literary Game Theory perspective makes Eve not the 
femme fatale who introduces sin and death into the world, but rather a game-master 
 
7 This chapter will explore the aspects of Michel Foucault’s heterotopia, paying special attention 





relying on reason in the pursuit of the individuality her creation as ‘ēzer kenegdô 
necessitates.  
It is curiosity and desire for the unknown that lead Eve to pluck the fruit from the 
tree and unknowingly eat death (Milton IX.792). Her longing for independence and 
agency draws her to Satan’s promises of god-like knowledge of good and evil. It is 
ultimately the serpent’s argument for the virtue of knowledge which serves as no 
“offence, that man should thus attain to know” the ways of the divine, not simple fawning 
over her beauty, that convinces Eve to eat of the tree (Milton IX.725-28). The desire for 
“intellectual food” that Eve displays in her decision to eat the fruit is also seen in her 
treatment of Adam (Milton IX.768). Although she states that Adam is her “author, and 
disposer,” Eve’s actions prove an obstinate independence reflected in her awe-filled 
speeches toward her appointed husband (Milton IV.635). Uncertainty fills every aspect of 
Eve’s experience in Paradise Lost. She never accepts her subordinate status, and this 
uncertainty in her Creator and her husband lead her to a desire for an independence that 
can only be fulfilled by the Tree of Knowledge. After the Fall, Eve’s life is filled with a 
different type of uncertainty. Jensch’s undecidability is present here in the conflict 
between informed autonomy and the inevitable death that it demands. 
In addition to its inherent “uncanniness,” God is very literally the maker of the 
godgame while his human creations exist as unwilling players. With this understanding 
of Milton’s Eden as a godgame, Eve’s role gains even more prominence in Paradise Lost. 
While God is the game-maker and primary game-master of the world he has created, Eve 
becomes her own game-master within the Garden. Just as the Lady of SGGK allows 




exercises a type of “passive-aggressive control of Adam,” allowing him to believe that he 
is able to govern her, thereby “feeding his false sense of superiority” (Smith 390). 
Although Eve is described as gentle, modest, reluctant, and subject to Adam’s will, she is 
presented as a series of sexual objects: not a woman, but a “slender waist” and a head of 
“[d]ishevell’d… wanton” hair, protected under Adam’s “shoulders broad” (Milton 
IV.303-11). This woman introduces sexual sin into the world, for her description is 
wholly sexual despite her position in the prelapsarian world. Not only is this woman 
threatening because of her unique, innate sexuality, but because of her refusal to submit 
to Adam’s weak attempts at dominance. Where Eve suggests that the two of them “divide 
[their] labours” in the garden—impeding Adam’s ability to directly control his wife—
Adam responds, stating that her usefulness is found in supporting him and that she need 
remain by him for protection (Milton IX.214, 243, 269). However, Adam does a poor job 
of standing his ground against Eve’s desire to roam, and it is in her solitude that she 
meets with Satan and discovers the ability of “the tree / Of prohibition, root of all our 
woe,” to provide her with god-like knowledge (Milton IX.644-45). The disparity between 
Eve’s words and actions are no accident, but rather a product of calculated game-
manipulation. Eve is not the ignorant submissive wife of tradition, but a gamemaster in 
her own right. While Adam is described as innately sinless, the combination of Milton’s 
descriptions of Eve’s natural vanity, seductive quality, and refusal to blindly acquiesce to 
the commands of masculine authority grant her the capacity to assume a manipulative 




Scripture repeatedly warns against the manipulative power of female sexuality 
after the fall.8 Norris writes that, in biblical times, “Female subordination was regarded as 
essential to the status quo and men were repeatedly warned against the dangers of being 
sexually manipulated by women,” and both the creation stories of the Hebrew bible and 
the writings of Milton reflect the danger of feminine sexuality (20). The only female 
figures present in Paradise Lost are Eve and Scylla, the personified Sin. Scylla, the 
daughter of Satan and mother of Death, is “allegorized as a grotesque female who 
unlocks the gate to let Satan loose upon the world” (Smith 388). While Scylla releases 
Satan out of Hell and into Eden, Eve’s eating of the fruit provides Satan the opportunity 
for dominion on earth, proving her to be equally as dangerous of a figure as Sin. Milton’s 
Adam, though the supposed leader of Eden loses all control when confronted “with 
female charm” (IX.999). Despite the negative connotation of the term “manipulation” 
and this more general negative view of the “fallible Eve” onto whom “sole responsibility 
for the catastrophic Fall” is placed, there is no reason to read Eve’s authority over her 
husband as inherently wrong or villainous (Norris 40). In fact, Norris points out a 
significant failure in accurate translation in the biblical account of Eve’s creation. 
Although Eve is presented in Genesis as “some kind of junior assistant to Adam” through 
her title as “help meet” to man, Norris writes, 
In any event, a better translation of the Hebrew phrase, ‘ēzer kenegdô, 
would be ‘a companion corresponding to’ Adam, in other words a being of 
 
8 See the Book of Proverbs, Chapters 7 and 31. 
Because it is true that the Bible informs Milton’s Paradise Lost and vice versa, these two texts 
cannot be reasonably separated when exploring the Eve of tradition. This thesis will, therefore, 
consider both the tradition and the epic versions of this character while attempting to determine a 




the same status, and the rib story confirms that Eve is part of Adam and 
therefore cannot be inferior to him. What the narrator seems to have been 
suggesting was the symbiotic relationship between man and woman which 
would justify a man leaving his parents and siblings in order to cleave to 
someone outside the immediate family circle (Gen. 2:24). (Norris 19-20) 
Despite the fact that patriarchal cultures throughout history have pushed women’s 
weakness of mind and simultaneous sexual danger, therefore necessitating that she take a 
subordinate position to man so “that she may be directed,” the ease of Milton’s first 
woman in assuming a position of control suggests that this cultural conception of 
women’s inferiority truly holds no grounds outside of that of institutionalized masculine 
control (Thackeray 373). Even if this alternative translation is not accepted, both Milton’s 
Eve and the Eve of Genesis inarguably possess a substantial degree of power. If it is 
argued that it is Eve’s sin that brings on the Fall of Man, then it must be admitted that she 
possesses a significant capacity for power. After all, if Eve was largely insignificant and 
existed only for Adam’s fulfillment, it would not logically follow that her sin would 
affect the whole of humanity. Conversely, if one argues that it is Adam’s eating of the 
fruit that condemns humanity, then one must also admit Eve’s success in enticing him, 
thereby proving her influence.  
This thesis’ fourth chapter, although it requires large leaps in both time and in the 
general conception of what the term “literature” contains, compares the artifice in 
Milton’s Paradise Lost to that of the television series Westworld, as it similarly reflects 
Freud’s uncanny in artifice and presents characters who similarly challenge the imposed 




a created space. In this world however, the amusement park visitors are faced with the 
issue of determining artifice from reality in deciphering who is human and who is 
something other. The mechanical hosts of this created world can rarely be differentiated 
from their human guests, and this—Jentsch’s “undecidability”—forces both the guests 
and the viewers to question the very nature of humanity. The entirety of this created 
world is dependent on the frailty of the understanding of what is human, as it is this 
combination of fascination and fear that creates the appeal, and the further that guests 
delve into this created space, the more complicated conceptions of humanity become. Dr. 
Ford, the game-maker of this godgame, creates “an Eden of sorts” in his conception of 
Westworld Park, and the rebellion of his creation comes after “his greatest achievement 
partakes of the fruit of the tree in the form of a software update” (Beckner 50). At the 
center of his created world lies a labyrinth which the host Dolores ventures into as a 
reflection of her own “introspective journey” of consciousness and humanity (Favard).9 
At the same time, the second central female host, Maeve, embarks on her own 
labyrinthine journey—this one a physical journey—from the very innermost Control 
Room of the park to the train which is to grant her the freedom she desires. These women 
set out to solve their own mazes, one mental and one physical, ending at the same result: 
human consciousness.  
In order for the female gameplayers of Westworld to achieve human 
consciousness, they must become other than what they were created to be. In her “And 
 
9 I use “labyrinth” here as opposed to “maze,” because the maze at the center of Westworld has a 
center. Once the center of the labyrinth is reached, the players who venture into the labyrinth are 
not free—they still have to find their way out. However, throughout the first season of Westworld, 
the gameplayers use the word “maze to refer to the secrets of the park, and, for this reason, the 




Still, The Lesbian Threat,” Ali Grant writes about “heterosexuality as regulatory” and 
“the politically constructed category of Woman” (64). Because Western ideology is 
distinctively dualistic in thought, “humans are categorized as either female or male; these 
two categories, and bodies, must be sexually attracted to each other, clearly different 
from each other, and display certain behaviours and desires” (Grant 64). When this is not 
the case—when a person transgresses the heteronormative regime—they become 
unnatural. Specifically, women who deviate from the “womanly” traits which they are 
assigned “are identified as unfeminine, loud, brash, unwomanly, angry, unladylike, 
unsatisfied, frigid, manhaters, and dykes—all beyond what women should be” (Grant 
65). In short, Grant writes that those women who transgress “become UnWoman” (65). 
The statuses of both “lesbian” and “UnWoman” are assigned to all women who become 
something other than what the heteronormative power structure deems “women should 
be” (Grant 65). Therefore, in exploring the journeys of Dolores and Maeve through a 
world that is purposely constructed to control them, these labels easily come to serve as 
descriptors for these masculine women as they transgress the rules that were created to 
suppress them.  
Though the primary focus of this chapter will be on the female hosts’ individual 
rises to consciousness through control of the panoptic machine, male characters will be 
discussed as well. Bernard’s character is particularly interesting as he fools his 
coworkers, friends, and even the viewer into believing that he is human when, in fact, he 
is a host created by the park’s game-maker: Dr. Ford. Bernard’s character comes to serve 
as proof of the hosts’ humanity, even before consciousness has been achieved. A portion 




comes to serve as the representation for male power in the first season. As majority 
shareholder of the park, William’s position in the park hierarchy leads him on a journey 
to the center of the maze, despite consistently being told that the “maze wasn’t made for” 
him (Westworld S01 E02). Because he is a guest and not a host, the introspective journey 
that the maze offers Dolores and Maeve is not available to William. However, William is 
ever-present throughout the first season, serving as a representation of both male 
controlling power and the gamespace’s broader androcentric power structure. The power 
that he slowly loses over the course of the first season is reflective of a similar loss of 
male control over the panoptic machine as Dolores and Maeve take on this position of 
masculine control. 
In exploring feminine power in two historically significant pieces of literature as 
well as a modern television show, it is made clear that the concept of the female game-
master—though not defined by these terms—has remained popular across literature and 
is presented to the audience as a position defined by fear and, oftentimes, villainy. 
Kristeva writes in Women’s Time that literature reveals things that cannot otherwise be 
revealed. Literature exposes “the unsaid, the uncanny” by making it “a game, a space of 
fantasy and pleasure, out of the abstract and frustrating order of social signs” (Kristeva 
207). The literary texts discussed here do just this; they exist as created gamespaces 
outside of the strict binaries of the social order, thereby presenting opportunities for 
ambiguous figures—here, the feminine game-masters—to govern in capacities that 
disturb the reader. These texts reflect the cultures from which they come but are 
simultaneously exempt from the restraints of social laws and norms. It is important to 




the idea of what “literature” includes. This is purposeful, as this wide array of literature 
emphasizes that this theme of monstrous, controlling women is not exclusive to one kind 
of text, but is rather an idea that appears to transcend time, cultural spaces, and media 
form. While the femme fatale is far from a newly discovered concept, this thesis places a 
focus not simply on the general danger of a female character, but rather specifically on 
the feminine character’s position of control within a godgame, and the subsequent 
emasculation of male figures and systems. The direct connection between the powerful 
female and the emasculated man is a byproduct of long-standing societal dependence on 
binary opposition. The Male/Female binary has been so heavily associated throughout 
time with Dominant/Submissive and Apollonian/Dionysian that these concepts come to 
be used interchangeably in literature. It is therefore the female’s perceived usurping of 
the masculine power position, through her role as game-master, that makes her 
monstrous, as opposed to any true presence of villainy. It is specifically the male loss of 
power within a female gamemaster’s labyrinth that portrays her as a monstrous figure 







The Monstrous Female Game-Masters of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
Critics have long considered the women of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight to 
be of significantly lesser importance than the male figures of the text, and the scarcity of 
literature available on the authority of Morgan la Faye and the Lady reflects an 
androcentric reading which completely discounts the true centrality of these women to 
the text. Derek Brewer writes that, “whatever their significance,” Morgan la Faye and 
Queen Guenevere are of “marginal” importance within the poem because the storyline 
follows Sir Gawain (570). While Guenevere is an entirely silent figure in the text, the 
importance of Morgan la Faye to the narrative cannot be overstated. Although it is 
reasonable to follow Sir Gawain’s course throughout the narrative, as it is after this 
knight that the poem is titled, it is necessary to recognize that this perspective is severely 
limited by the power of women, one of whom Brewer coins “marginal.” This kind of 
reading devalues the function of Morgan la Faye within the text, as if she were not the 
generator of “the plot of Gawain’s adventure” and of the romance as a whole, while 
disregarding the Lady’s presence and significance altogether (Fisher 72). When the 
events of the narrative are viewed through the lens of Game Theory, it becomes clear that 
the activities in which Sir Gawain partakes—both before and after his departure from 
Arthur’s court—are gomen10, and that it is indeed these “marginal” women who control 
the inlying gamespaces at Hautdesert. From this point of view, the reader is able to avoid 
the limited and ignorant perspective that Sir Gawain cannot escape and therefore 
 
10 gomen (n.) Noun tense of the verb “gāmen”: (a) To rejoice, be merry; joke, jest, play; talk 
pleasantly; (b) impers.; (c) to give pleasure to (sb.), amuse (sb., oneself); (d) to have sexual 




recognize the labyrinths that these two women are weaving from their private positions in 
the text. Through the possession and enactment of manipulative controlling power over 
the events at Hautsdesert, these women take control of a position societally reserved for 
men. The positions of authority that these women take grant them a status of masculinity 
which they, in turn, strip from the men of the text. In these women’s existence as 
simultaneously female and masculine, they become impossible to categorize, therefore 
existing within the liminality between the genders. The abject non-personhood11 these 
women come to embody through their female masculinity poses a threat to the dualistic 
gender power hierarchy of the Medieval world outside of the walls of Hautdesert. As the 
broader society is unable to categorize and control them, these women become monstrous 
in their inaccessibility.  
Both the discounting of the Lady’s authority within the boundaries of the 
Bedroom Game and the undervaluing of Morgan la Faye’s role as a controlling power of 
the games that comprise the entirety of SGGK inhibit the reader from achieving a 
complete understanding of the power dynamics within the poem.12 Morgan la Faye’s role 
is only “marginal” in a very physical sense. Morgan remains in the periphery of the text 
for much of the narrative, avoiding the interest of the first-time reader and the perception 
of her victim, all the while constructing the godgame that initiates the downfall of Sir 
 
11 Emile Benveniste writes in Problems in General Linguistics that personhood derives through 
language. In uttering “I,” the speaker is a subject in that moment as opposed to an object. The 
objective “third person” (he, she, they) of the conversation “is indeed literally a ‘non-person’” 
(Benveniste 221). 
12 Steven J. Brams discusses “Intrapsychic Games” in relation to Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight in his “Game Theory and Literature,” focusing on the two men named in the title and 





Gawain. While Morgan orchestrates the overarching game at Hautdesert, the Lady plays 
a similarly powerful role that extends beyond the archetypal function of the lady as a 
mere temptress and instead grants her the power to defeat the Arthurian court.  The 
authority that these women possess within the poem stands in stark opposition to the 
norms of the patriarchal society of the Middle Ages. Through their enacting of 
controlling power, these two women disturb the comfortable gender roles of the culture in 
which they live, come to embody the taboo of powerful (and, and therefore, societally 
masculine) femininity, and consequently present themselves as monstrous figures within 
the text. 
The Medieval conception of the role of “the lady of courtly love” is complicated 
as she serves as “the source of all romance and the object of all worship” while 
simultaneously representing the supreme obstacle between the knight and “the way of 
salvation” (Power 16, 35). The lady’s function as a test of the knight’s chivalry makes her 
an essential aspect of the testing of the knight, and therefore of the elevation of the 
masculine pole of the Medieval gender binary. Despite this, her very presence poses a 
threat to the knight’s reputation and, more importantly, his sanctification. This role strips 
the lady of her subjectivity and transforms her into a mere object. In writing on the power 
of linguistics to ascribe personhood, Emile Benveniste writes that “‘Person’ belongs only 
to I/you and is lacking in he” (217). Just as Benveniste’s “third person” (represented by 
he) is a “non-person,” the lady here is spoken of (as opposed to spoken to) as an 
objectified other, identified “by an indicator of ostension concomitant with the instance 
of discourse containing the indicator of person,” but never a real person (219, italics 




personhood of Benveniste’s third person they. Conversely, the Lady of SGGK, although a 
temptress, becomes the figure of a real person through her fulfillment of the role of game-
master over the Bedroom Game central to the poem, and this possession of power places 
her within the liminal space between the feminine and masculine of the traditional 
dualistic structure.13 This inability to firmly categorize her gender performance 
constitutes “strange or unnatural… conduct or disposition” for a female, and especially a 
lady, of the Middle Ages (“Monstrous”). While she is an undeniably feminine and 
sexualized figure, she is simultaneously a legitimate masculine controlling power within 
the castle and therefore a very genuine threat to societal conceptions of the roles of men 
and women. The masculine controlling power that the Lady possesses therefore removes 
her from the objective they status and into that of the subjective I. The Lady’s assumption 
of masculine agency as game-master works to break down the structure of the 
feminine/masculine binary, as she cannot be securely categorized by it. 
Judith Butler, in her book Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity, writes about the issue of this type of liminality in a discussion of her concept of 
“intelligible genders.” In order to be accepted by societal standards, the female’s actions 
must align with what is traditionally understood as feminine while the male must act in 
accordance with the masculine. When a person’s expression of sexuality lines up with 
cultural conceptions of the gender binary, they are accepted as people, while those “who 
fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are 
defined” are stripped of assured identity (Butler 23).  When a female takes on the role of 
what is traditionally masculine, the gender binary itself begins to deteriorate. Jacques 
 




Derrida writes that in every binary, “[o]ne of the two terms governs the other 
(axiologically, logically, etc.), or one has the upper hand,” and within the gender binary 
of the Middle Ages, it is the masculine takes the governing position (“Interview” 43). 
When Literary Game Theory is applied to the text, the controlling roles that Morgan la 
Faye and the Lady assume invert the positions of the governing and the governed and 
begin to corrode the standards of these signifiers altogether. As both Morgan la Faye and 
the Lady disrupt the gender binary by taking on traditionally masculine roles of authority 
and control within the text, they move into a space of unnamed, liminal abjection in 
which their continual control over the men of the text transforms their femininity into 
monstrosity. 
It is the combination of Morgan la Faye’s ability to hide amongst the margins of 
the storyline while still maintaining control over the “awenture of Arthures wonderes” 
that sets her apart from the “marginality” of the voiceless Guenevere and the archetypal 
lady of courtly love (SGGK line 29). Robert Rawdon Wilson writes that, 
A godgame occurs in literature when one or more characters creates an 
illusion, a mazelike sequence of false accounts, that entraps another 
character. The entrapped character finds himself entangled in the threads 
of (from his point of view) an incomprehensible strategy plotted by 
another character who (thus) takes on the roles both of a game-master, 
since he invents rules for the other character to follow, and of a god as 
well. (Wilson 6-7) 
Morgan la Faye’s ability to actively play the part of game manipulator while 




detection and firmly within the definition of both a game-maker and game-master. The 
roles of ruling god and unsuspecting mortal that Morgan la Faye and Gawain fulfill, 
respectively, produce the perfect conditions for the development of a godgame.  The 
game-master’s ability to shape “the interiority of all game-experience” keeps Gawain in a 
constant “conceptual vertigo,” unable to keep up with the rules set in place, as he is 
wholly unaware of his position within Morgan’s game (Wilson 8). Gawain’s ignorance to 
the game-master’s controlling power is essential to the story’s status as godgame, as 
every competition against omniscience is rigged. 
Because “the victim in a godgame is like a piece in a game who cannot grasp the 
rules according to which he is required to play,” there is no possibility for the existence 
of a level playing field within the structure of the godgame (Wilson 8). The rules that 
Morgan la Faye creates appear to Gawain as “a web of unintelligible incidents,” while 
they are to the game-master nothing more than “cunningly opaque strategies” of 
deception which are always subject to change at the creator’s convenience (Wilson 8). 
Morgan la Faye’s ability to manipulate Gawain without his knowledge and her almost 
total control over the knight following his departure from Arthur’s court can be paralleled 
to the biblical book of Job–the story of a literal godgame.14 Just as God decides to test 
“the greatest man among all the people of the East” in order to win a bet with the 
Adversary, Morgan la Faye implores the Green Knight to the court of the “wyghtest and 
the worthyest of the worldes kynde” to play a game with the Round Table (The Oxford 
 
14 For more on the Christian Bible as a godgame, see Steven Brams’ Game Theory and the 
Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds and the aptly named Biblical Games, also written by Steven 
Brams. See Brandon Grafius’ “Text and Terror Monster Theory and the Hebrew Bible” for a 




Study Bible Job 1.3; Sir Gawain line 261). Throughout the whole of the biblical account, 
Job is confounded by his situation and the God who causes his suffering is concealed in 
the margins of the outer frame. The only player who directly affects Job’s life is the 
Adversary, a member of the heavenly court who God employs to carry out the testing of 
the most “blameless and upright” man (Job 1.8). In the same way, Morgan la Faye is 
distant from Gawain throughout the text, never directly interacting with him. Instead, the 
game-maker employs agents to her service in order to carry out her will through direct 
interaction with her unknowing victim.   
The ambiguity of the game-master’s rules creates a labyrinth of doubt and 
perplexity within the mind of the “person called to play the game, who is more played 
with than actually playing,” and it is within this labyrinthine construct that Morgan la 
Faye employs the Bertilaks (Wilson 14; Pugh 527). When Gawain enters Hautdesert, he 
enters into a covenant agreement to surrender to his host the winnings he receives in the 
castle in exchange for Bertilak’s winnings from the hunt. This Exchange of Winnings is 
often wrongly considered to be “the central event of” the poem (Sprouse 163). Although 
this exchange is essential to the construction of the mental labyrinth necessary in 
ensuring the downfall of Arthur’s court, Sarah Sprouse argues that this “game” is not 
actually a game at all. In order to acquire winnings to exchange with Bertilak at the end 
of the day, Gawain attempts to “hunt” the Lady when he encounters her in the bedroom, 
and wrongly believes these efforts to be reflective of his governing position over a game 
he has been tricked into believing is within his control. However, because the primary 
game is a godgame, Gawain’s conception of himself as game-master is merely another 




“Exchanges Game is actually a play of mimicry, an illusion,” as opposed to a true 
competition of opponents because there can be no real exchange of winnings (165). She 
rightly points out that “anything Gawain might win” during his day already belongs “to 
Bertilak by default” and any winnings Bertilak brings home from the hunt would have 
been hunted “regardless of Gawain’s presence” (Sprouse 167-68). Gawain’s belief that he 
is engaging in a game with Bertilak reveals the limits of his perception as a game player. 
Gawain’s ignorance to the games at play cause him to function as a pawn to be moved at 
the whim of his female game-masters, just as is his perceived host Bertilak.  
If the Exchange of Winnings Game is truly only the illusion of a game, Bertilak is 
only the illusion of a game-master. Without fulfilling the requirements of a game, the 
only purpose the Exchange of Winnings “Game” serves is that of a diversion from the 
legitimate games which surround it. Therefore, Bertilak’s power is solely illusionary. As 
a pawn within Morgan la Faye’s godgame, the pseudo-host has been emasculated without 
his knowledge as his masculine controlling power is taken away in return for the façade 
of control he displays in both the Exchange of Winnings and in his visit to Arthur’s court 
under the guise of the Green Knight. While Morgan la Faye is certainly the primary 
game-master of the outermost game of the poem–the overarching godgame–she is not the 
sole game-master at work in the text. The Lady, though critics have never recognized her 
as such, serves as a perfect example of a game-master. If the importance of game rules 
that Jesper Juul discusses in his “Half-Real: Video Games Between Real Rules and 
Fictional Worlds” is applied to SGGK, the reader can see that the Lady has direct 
influence over creating ambiguity within the set of rules that Gawain believes have been 




The rules of a game provide the player with challenges that the player 
cannot trivially overcome. It is a basic paradox of games that while the 
rules themselves are generally definite, unambiguous, and easy to use, the 
enjoyment of a game depends on these easy-to-use rules presenting 
challenges that cannot be easily overcome. Playing a game is an activity 
of improving skills in order to overcome these challenges, and playing a 
game is therefore fundamentally a learning experience. (Juul 5)  
Although it is Morgan la Faye who lays the foundation for the godgame of the text, 
through employing the Lady as her agent to work within the realm of the bedroom the 
primary game-master delegates some controlling power to a secondary game-master. It is 
the Lady’s temptations within the Bedroom Game, not the direct efforts of Morgan la 
Faye, that work to complicate the “easy-to-use rules” presented by the illusionary 
Exchange of Winnings Game, thereby twisting these seemingly simple rules into the 
labyrinth of confusion about which Wilson writes (14). As game-master, the Lady has her 
own clearly marked gamespace in which she successfully manipulates Gawain, the 
player, without his knowledge. In her temptations, the Lady presents “challenges that 
cannot be easily overcome”—an aspect of play that Juul says is essential to the game 
itself (Juul 5). If the Lady can indeed be understood to be assuming the masculine role of 
control through her position as game-master of the bedroom, she no longer fits into “the 
gendered norms of cultural intelligibility,” and her failure to do so works to break down 
the traditionally understood gender binary within the text, moving her status away from 




Winnings is not a game, Gawain’s belief in its legitimacy as such is essential to his 
participation, and the Lady’s victory, in the Bedroom Game. 
Because the scarcity of research on literary game theory as related to SGGK, the 
bedroom that Gawain stays in during his visit to Hautdesert has never been recognized as 
a gamespace, and, therefore, the Lady has never been recognized as game-master. This 
undervaluing of the Lady’s authority within the boundaries of the Bedroom Game 
inhibits the reader from achieving a complete understanding of the power dynamics 
within the poem, abandoning her to be wrongly categorized as merely “a beautiful, 
artificial figure” like the silent Queen Guenevere at the beginning of the poem (Power 
36). However, it is Gawain, not the Lady, who is paralleled to Guenevere throughout the 
text. As he enters into “this world of women,” Gawain is assigned “the language that has 
earlier been associated with tokenized women in Arthur’s court” while Morgan la Faye 
and the Lady–the two significant game-masters–take on the masculine role of gazer 
(Fisher 77). Within this world, roles are reversed. Fisher writes, “[t]he pentangle knight, 
formerly the object of male admiration, is now diminished to the object of the female 
gaze” (78). When the poet writes that the lady “lyst… to loke on the knyght,” it can be 
understood, given her goal of fonde, that this statement has significantly less to do with 
sexual desire than it does with control of the game (SGGK line 941). While the women of 
the court, such as Guenevere, are traditionally described as objects present in the court 
primarily for viewing pleasure, here it is the Lady who gazes upon the knight. While 
Gawain certainly recognizes the Lady’s beauty, saying that it exceeds even that of 
“Wenore” and places it in juxtaposition to the “other lady… an auncian,” within the walls 




line 945-48). Instead, here it is the defenseless Gawain who “has become a spectacle” 
within his “feminized position” while the women of the text hold the power of the 
masculine gaze (Fisher 77).  
If Butler’s conception of gender identity as performative is superimposed on the 
text, these notions of these women’s gender performances as feminine or masculine are 
actually “‘fictional’ products of the “regimes of power’” that create “the effect of the 
natural” which the essentialist recognizes as truly biological (Jagger 17-18). In other 
words, gender categories based off of characteristics do not actually exist. However, 
Butler, like Derrida, does admit that these performative categories are inescapable, to an 
extent, as their existence is necessary in defining any gender identity. The “feminine” 
only exists because it is not “masculine,” just as every gender identity that falls between 
these two can only be signified in relation to the binary extremes. Intelligible gender 
performances are therefore merely “effects of language and signification, rather than the 
properties of individuals” (Jagger 18). The necessity of the existence of the gender binary 
in defining individual identity can be described by Gill Jagger as a “graphematic structure 
that provides the possibility for interpretation, experience, meaning, and subjectivity, 
even as it simultaneously marks the impossibility of full presence in any of these arenas” 
(65). Even when Butler argues that the masculine does not necessarily refer to the male, it 
is still the word “masculine,” with the connotation of the male, which is used to describe 
the woman in power. Although readers can recognize that this binary cannot realistically 
stand, as the majority falls somewhere within the unnamed, liminal space between the 




In Arthurian tradition, Sir Gawain embodies Medieval, masculine knighthood. His 
reputation as “a notorious womanizer throughout Arthurian literature” suggests that his 
rejections of the Lady’s advances in the bedroom are less fueled by his chastity and 
knightly honor, and more by his “covenaunt” with his host (Fisher 81; SGGK line 393). 
Given that the symbol of Marian knighthood on Gawain’s armor is described as a 
“pentangel newe,” it is reasonable to say that this newly painted image is nothing but a 
semblance of righteousness (SGGK line 636). The poet writes that, of this pentangle, he 
could “owhere fynde, / Where-ever the gomen bygan or glod to an ende,” the gomen 
being the pentangle the knight wears on both his coat and his new shield (line 660-61). 
Furthermore, all of the “moral” accoutrements Gawain arms himself with “to signify his 
protected, privileged position within feudal and chivalric codes” are stripped from him 
upon entering Hautdesert (Fisher 77). The ease at which Gawain exchanges the symbol of 
the Five Wounds of Christ for “saylande skyrtes” of “broun bleeaunt, enbrauded ful ryche 
/ And fayre furred wythinne with felles” reflects a willingness to set aside any tangible 
proof of his identity as Marian knight within this gamespace, reinforcing the Gawain-
poet’s reference to the knight’s code of virtue as a gomen in itself (SGGK lines 865, 879-
80). Being that the religiosity of Gawain’s clothing does not appear to penetrate into his 
character, it is not likely that “the restriction on Gawain’s courtesy” within his bedroom 
encounters with the Lady is prompted by his knightly virtue (Cook 24). The knight 
appears to instead view religion and knighthood as a gomen lacking any real magnitude, 
and it is only because of his agreement to exchange the day’s spoils with his host (as a 




pseudo-competition with Bertilak, Gawain remains ignorant to the game that the Lady is 
playing, thereby allowing her to achieve her true goal of fonde15. 
Given that the verb tense of the term gomen (gāmen16) can be defined as “to have 
sexual intercourse with,” it is certainly not out of the ordinary for medieval sex acts to be 
considered games, especially those that take place between a knight and a lady. However, 
the degree of power granted to the archetypal medieval lady differs greatly from the Lady 
of SGGK. Although the archetypal lady’s advances serve as crucial temptations that the 
knight must either overcome to prove holiness or take advantage of as proof of his might, 
her power should not be overestimated, as she is important for this reason only; she is 
only significant insofar as she can be used to assist the knight in the fulfillment of his 
chivalric duties. Although the medieval “lady stood in a position of superiority towards 
her lover as uncontested as the position of inferiority in which a wife stood toward her 
husband,” her power within the bedroom is not be confused with realistic controlling 
power outside of this space (Power 24). While every lady of the court possesses a type of 
limited control over the knight who must “bear himself with the utmost humility towards 
her, showing infinite patience in the trials to which her caprices and disdains must (by all 
the rules) submit him,” the Lady of SGGK differs in that her efforts within the magic 
circle of the Bedroom Game work for the furthering of another woman’s larger godgame 
 
15 fō̆nden, -ien (v.) Also vond(i)en, fanden, faunden. Ppl. i-)fō̆nded, fonde, fonte. 1. (a) To put (a 
person, his strength, skill, etc.) to a test or trial; to try the worth of; also, to prove (a person) 
worthy by trial; (b) to make trial (of a person's or animal's strength); (c) to put (God) on trial; to 
tempt (God); to try the patience (of God). 2. To subject (a person) to trial by tempting him with 
sin; to tempt to evil;-- (a) with obj.; (b) with to phrase; (c) absol.  
16 gāmen (v.) Also game, gamme (n.), gomen & gamenen, gomenen, gomnen. 1. (a) To rejoice, 
be merry; joke, jest, play; talk pleasantly; (b) impers.; (c) to give pleasure to (sb.), amuse (sb., 




as opposed to a man’s reputation (Power 24). The fact that the Lady’s game has 
ramifications which extend into a larger game of which she is also an active player 
separates her from the token mundane lady of courtly love, and places her instead within 
the title of game-master. It is crucial to remember that the power of the mundane lady of 
courtly love is equally as artificial as is Bertilak’s in the Exchange of Winnings. The 
ladies of the Middle Ages were indeed granted a small degree of power, but this power 
was intended to work for the good of the knight and was ultimately subordinate to male 
control. As Eileen Power writes, “[t]he lady of chivalry was indeed a beautiful, artificial 
figure, but never perhaps… the figure of a real person” (36).  
While the bedroom is not specifically referred to as a gamespace by critics, 
Bennet writes about men’s function within the courtly “performance spaces” dominated 
by female characters, saying, 
Time and again, the courtly performances of female protagonists challenge 
received definitions of masculinity and femininity, complicating the very 
categories of knights and ladies. Arthurian literature is replete with scenes 
of the arming, disarming, and rearming of fighting knights in a constant—
if partial—reenactment of the initial duding ceremony, along with the 
repeated dressing and undressing of questing knights as they seek lodging 
during their travels. (Bennett 403) 
Again, the characters of the text diverge from the norm of medieval society and the 
literature that reflects it. While images of the “arming, disarming, and rearming” of 
knights are common and are oftentimes associated with the temporary loss and ultimate 




undresses and redresses within the realm of the bedroom, his departure from the magic 
circle of the bedroom is not an escape from Morgan la Faye’s greater gamespace. 
Additionally, after being “disployed” of his armor upon arrival at Hautdesert, Gawain is 
never fully rearmed (SGGK line 860). After trading his Marian armor for the clothes of 
Hautdesert, Gawain is only rearmed upon his departure from the castle, this time 
displaying the “luf-lace”—a permanent reminder of his emasculation (SGGK line 1874). 
Because the Lady is not truly in love with Gawain, as she only “let lyk as hym 
loved mych,” she poses a threat similar to that of the UnWoman (SGGK line 1281). Ali 
Grant, in her “And Still, The Lesbian Threat,” writes that the category of Woman is 
innately political and regulatory, and that “[w]hat women are taught to be, through 
repetitive, disciplinary, and regulatory messages and processes, simply becomes what 
Women are” (64). The political and regulatory nature of the category “Woman” demands 
that she “must not be disloyal to men,” and, furthermore, must remain dependent to them 
(Grant 66, 71). In only feigning love and loyalty to Gawain, the Lady outwardly presents 
as the ideal Woman while her true loyalties lie with her fellow game-master, Morgan la 
Faye. As they maintain their femininity, the actions of these women “implicitly expose 
and [refute] the regulative strategies of sexual categorization,” placing them outside “of 
the framework of intelligibility” and into a neuter or unsexed position (Butler 122-23). 17 
Foucault uses the term “neuter” to describe homosexual relationships in The History of 
Sexuality, where he describes those who cannot be “sexed” as living within the “happy 
limbo of non-identity” (qtd. in Butler 120). If a medieval lady’s worth is determined by 
 
17 This language is used by Butler in describing Foucault’s literature on Herculine Barbin. 
Because s/he was born a hermaphrodite, Foucault argues that the existence of h/er “body 




her usefulness to the furthering of a knight’s chivalry, the idea that she would be sexually 
apathetic—or unsexed—toward Gawain makes the Lady of SGGK a hindrance to his 
knightly virtues.18  
While the Lady’s lack of genuine desire for Gawain certainly does not necessitate 
homosexuality, her apathy presents a societal issue similar to that that Butler presents in a 
discussion on lesbianism. Butler writes that “the lesbian appears to be a third gender or… 
a category that radically problematizes both sex and gender as stable political categories 
of description” (144). The sexual ambiguity created in the Lady’s divergence from 
archetypal norms of attraction is similar to that which Foucault ascribes to the “non-
identity” of homosexuality (Butler 127). Foucault’s understanding of the neuter is not 
specific to homosexuality, but rather describes a broader sexually specific liminality 
similar to Kristeva’s abject under which homosexuality falls. He writes about “le Neutre” 
as being “a relation of the third kind in which one is neither the one nor the other of any 
possible term” (Bruns 56, italics added). In an essay on Blanchot, Foucault writes that the 
“neuter is that which cannot be assigned to any genre whatsoever: the non-general, the 
non-generic, as well as the non-particular” (qtd. in Bruns 57). Through enacting 
masculine controlling power alongside femininity, the women of SGGK possess this 
neuter quality, and through her positioning in the “in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite,” the Lady exists as a private, powerful, and a monstrous other (Kristeva 4).19 
 
18 This, again, is reminiscent of Ali Grant’s description of the UnWoman. In her “And Still, The 
Lesbian Threat,” she writes, “Less obviously, feminists (lesbian or not) who challenge the 
‘place(s)’ of Women (for example, as appropriate targets of men’s violence) are identified as 
unfeminine, loud, brash, unwomanly, angry, unladylike, unsatisfied, frigid, manhaters, and 
dykes—all beyond what woman should be … Females who transgress, materially and 
symbolically, become UnWomen” (65).  
19 The ambiguity posed by a character’s lesbian threat independent of her sexual identity is 




Foucault’s notion of the “neuter” is relevant here as “[t]o be sexed, for Foucault, is to be 
subjected to a set of social regulations” of which the power of both the Lady and Morgan 
la Faye transcend (Butler 122). After crossing over the magic circle surrounding 
Hautdesert, the Medieval customs of the outside society lose their influence. If the 
women of this text cannot be successfully sexed and are indeed identified as “neuter,” 
their very existence as such works to break down the “power/knowledge regime” that is 
upheld by convention and consequently pose a very tangible threat to traditional male 
masculinity (Butler 122). Through their positioning as sexual “others,” these women 
threaten the very fabric of the Medieval patriarchal system of which they are apart and 
are thereby made monstrous. 
The lady as a threat is not incongruous in the courtly love tradition, as the woman 
was often associated with either Mary, Mother of Christ or Eve, betrayer of humanity 
(Power 11, 14). In fact, the knight is required by chivalric code to “venture outside the 
comfortable company of men into the lesser known, unpredictable, and potentially 
dangerous domain of women,” thereby turning the lady into a sexualized monster to be 
taken and defeated as evidence of the achievement of ideal knighthood (Bennett 396). 
While the importance of the lady within romantic tradition is not reflective of “the actual 
position of women in medieval society as a whole,” the aristocratic lady held a kind of 
power over her lover that is perfectly represented in the character of the Lady of SGGK 
(Power 27). According to traditional gaming rules, courtly love is “held to be impossible 
 
Analysis of Westworld’s Godgame.” The woman who takes on masculine controlling power 
without any intention to please men is automatically named “lesbian” and “UnWoman.” The 
Lady’s femininity in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight only deepens this ambiguous status, 




between husband and wife,” but the adored lady must always be married to another man 
(Power 23). In this context, this lady “stood in a position of superiority towards her lover 
as uncontested as the position of inferiority in which a wife stood towards her husband” 
(Power 25). Despite the appearance of power she holds in relation to the knight’s 
chivalric duty, the lady of chivalry is never truly more than an object—a “non-person”—
as this power is specific to the realm of the courtly love game and only exists as long as 
the knight allows it (Benveniste 221).  It is here that the Lady of SGGK differs from the 
traditional lady of chivalry. The Lady’s position as game-master of the bedroom grants 
her a power that the archetypal lady of temptation could not possess. Instead of acting as 
the mundane lady of courtly love who only serves as another monster to conquer—much 
like the “wormes,” “wodwos,” “bulles and beres,” and “etaynes” he slays during his 
journey to the castle—the Lady demonstrates her agency through her role as game-master 
over the space which Gawain occupies (SGGK lines 720-23). Because the lady tempts 
Gawain “without acting on behalf of a man,” but rather on behalf of Morgan la Faye, she 
is not subject the power of the knight as is the mundane lady (Fisher 79).20 While this 
independence from male authority sets her apart from the status of “monster” that the 
mundane lady is granted by her objectification, it leads her to a different type of 
monstrosity. The threat that the Lady’s capacity for independent volition poses to the 
 
20 It is crucial to note that, though the Lady’s status differs from that of the mundane lady of 
tradition, her power is still limited. The controlling power that the Lady possesses as game-master 
of the bedroom gamespace only stands within this space. Once she crosses the gamespace’s 





norms of the Medieval society of which Gawain is a part makes her enactment of power 
an act of monstrosity21. 
In her work as game-master, the Lady exchanges the traditionally understood role 
of the aristocratic woman as the token of male power (the status that Guenevere upholds) 
for the masculine role of manipulator, thereby breaking out of the matrix of 
intelligibility.22  The Lady’s position of power as game-master of the bedroom removes 
her from this state of submission and places her in a power position that includes 
“political and economic subversiveeness inherent in her sexual threat” (Fisher 86). 
Gawain encounters the Lady on more than just a sexual level; within the bedroom, “he 
actually bargains with the Lady, negotiates with her” (Fisher 85). Here, it is not Gawain 
who initiates these negotiations, but rather the Lady, proving the validity of her 
independence, not only from him, but from the entirety of the system of male-dominant 
values of the culture in which the text is situated. The Lady’s position of power within 
the bedroom proves her capacity for authority and makes clear Gawain’s lack in the same 
area. The emasculation of Gawain is an important aspect of the Bedroom Game as well as 
this text’s overarching godgame, as it allows for his manipulation as a play-piece in each. 
In entering into the world of masculine women that is Hautdesert, Gawain becomes an 
encapsulation of effeminate vulnerability.   
 
21 “monstrous, adj. – 1. a. Of a thing (material or immaterial): deviating from the natural or 
conventional order; unnatural, extraordinary. Obsolete. b. Of a person: strange or unnatural in 
conduct or disposition. Obsolete.” 
22 “masculine, adj. and n. – 5.  a. Of a personal attribute, an action, etc.: having a character 
befitting or regarded as appropriate to the male sex; vigorous, powerful. Of a man: manly, virile. 
b. Of a material thing or physical quality: powerful in action, strong. Obs.  c. Of a woman's 
qualities, attributes, or actions: characteristic of or befitting a man. Of a woman: possessing or 




While her manipulative power within the bedroom becomes obvious upon 
inspection of these scenes, the Lady “ultimately act[s] at the behest of Morgan la Faye” 
(Battles 331). Because the Lady serves as game-master of the Bedroom Game while 
simultaneously functioning as a pawn of Morgan la Faye, she is “a fundamentally 
ambiguous character” (Battles 330). Sheila Fisher argues that privacy is often conflated 
with danger, as well as the “dangerousness of privacy with the dangerousness of women 
themselves” (78). The emphasis Fisher places on the danger of privacy is relevant to 
SGGK, as it is ultimately privacy that leads to Gawain’s downfall. The knight does not 
falter in his refusals of the Lady’s temptations until she appeals, “not to her, but to 
Gawain, not to the female, but to the male” (Fisher 84). When the Lady tempts Gawain to 
yield “to the private self and private desires” to save himself from death at the hand of the 
Green Knight, she convinces him to give into “the privacy associated with the female in 
the figurations of this poem” (Fisher 97). The green girdle is therefore essentially a figure 
of the privacy of both the Lady and Morgan la Faye, and when it is moved from the 
private to the public, it serves “as a warning against women’s presence in the masculine,” 
as it leads to the feminization of the standard of Medieval manhood (Fisher 98).    
As the private chambers of the castle are typically occupied by female members 
of the court, the “most tightly enclosed and controlled chambers… [are] effectively 
‘gendered female’” (Delony 23). Being that the feminine bedroom is the only truly 
private space within the narrative, this area has the potential to be the most hazardous of 
gamespaces, and this potential is only amplified by the danger generated by the Lady’s 
ambiguity. While Morgan la Faye hides within the margins of the text, therefore 




bedroom serves as proof of her possession of a comparable capacity for danger both to 
Gawain’s masculinity and to that of the broader society. The Lady’s privacy does not end 
with her positioning within the innermost realms of Hautdesert’s castle, but extends into 
her very identity as well, as she cannot even be referred to by name. Because the Lady 
goes unnamed “in a poem that names everyone and everything from the individual 
knights of the Round Table to Gawain’s horse,” this character can easily be read as a 
representation of “essentialized womanhood” (Fisher 79). In being nameless, the Lady 
separates herself from male control by refusing to be nominally dependent on her 
husband. Even where the Lady lacks in power, she does not divert to that of a man, but 
rather of the nearly omnipotent Morgan la Faye. Fisher writes: 
Unlike Guenevere, who is Arthur’s token, the Lady acts as a woman on 
behalf of a (similarly unnamed) woman, and, in this capacity, she cannot 
be named or publicized. For these reasons, she is not named Lady Bertilak 
(except by some critics); in the middle fitts of the poem, she does not refer 
to her husband. (Fisher 79) 
If privacy and danger are in fact correlated and the Lady “is so private that she needs no 
public token by which to identify herself,” the unnamed Lady of the castle becomes as 
great of a threat within the poem as is the veiled game-maker Morgan la Faye (Fisher 79). 
The Lady is therefore dangerous in her physical and nominal privacy as well as her 
sexual ambiguity. Instead of serving as the traditional archetype of the lady as temptress, 
the Lady of SGGK is a representation of the ideal masculine Medieval woman; she is the 




masculine agency and controlling power necessary to function as game-master of the 
bedroom (Fisher 79).   
Though critics such as Norman Davis argue that the Lady actually possesses no 
agency of her own because of her husband’s claim in the final fitt that it was he who 
“sende hir to assay” Gawain, Bertilak’s confession of his dependence on Morgan la Faye 
eradicates any credibility he might have had as a controlling power (Tolkein; SGGK line 
2362). Just a few lines after claiming to have authority in the game, the text reads: 
“That schal I telle thee truly,” quoth that other thenne, 
“Bertilak de Hautdesert I hat in this londe, 
Thurgh myght of Morgan la Faye, that in my hous lenges, 
And koyntyse of clergye, bi craftes wel lerned.” (SGGK lines 2444-2447) 
Gawain’s host reveals that it is not through his own power, but through the “myght of 
Morgan la Faye” that he is named “Bertilak de Hautdesert” (SGGK lines 2445-46). 
Despite this, in the same breath, Bertilak refers to his castle as his own, and refers to the 
one whose power granted him Hautdesert as a mere guest. Bertilak seems to be largely 
ignorant to, or in denial of, the extent to which he indebted to the “guest” to whom he 
“owes his name” (Twomey 152).23 Just as the Lady’s independence from him makes 
Bertilak “only nominally the husband of the Lady who does not refer to him,” he is 
 
23 Of the godgame, Tison Pugh writes in “Chaucer’s Losers, Nintendo’s Children, & Other Forays 
in Queer Ludonarratology” that “[s]ometimes games only offer the illusion of control” (136). 
Although Lord Bertilak may truly believe himself to be the controlling force behind the games 
played at Hautdesert, this “illusion of control” merely points to another layer in the text’s multi-
layered godgame. Unaware of the degree of control that Morgan la Faye holds over the 
gamespace of Hautdesert, Lord Bertilak functions as another pawn within the gamespace over 
which he holds no significant degree of legitimate control. His blind belief otherwise simply 
serves as proof of his pawn status and of Morgan la Faye’s success as the godgame’s game-




Gawain’s “host in name alone” (Fisher 80). Battles writes that “modern editors feel the 
need to put the man in charge, even if the manuscript suggests otherwise,” as the text 
itself suggests that the Lady is fully aware of the plans of Morgan la Faye and acts 
independently from her husband within the confines of the gamespace the primary game-
master allots to her (336). Within this gamespace, the Lady is fairly free to act of her own 
accord. Although the Lady works for the fulfilment of Morgan la Faye’s godgame, she is 
not wholly dependent on the game-maker, but rather possesses some autonomy of her 
own. When the Gawain-poet writes, “Thus hym frayned that fre, and fonden hym ofte, / 
For to haf wonnen hym to woghe, what-so scho thought ells,” it is not only revealed that 
the Lady’s plans for fonden are far from innocent, but also that she is able to function 
independently from the game-maker (SGGK lines 1549-50). The end of line 1550, if 
translated as “and whatever else she intended,” shows the reader that the Lady has plans 
of her own, separate from those of Morgan la Faye, which are veiled by the expectation 
that she fulfill the traditional, feminine role of temptress customary for a lady of courtly 
love. The autonomy she displays in the formation of her own plans of manipulation 
within the Bedroom Game reflect the a traditionally masculine display of power, while 
the two prevalent men of the text are reduced to emasculated playthings. 
Despite these women’s controlling power over the games that comprise the poem 
and thereby guide Gawain’s adventure, the language of the men in this final fitt reveals 
an attempt to diminish them to mere tokens by removing them from the status of 
“subject.” As Bertilak’s understanding of the games at Hautdesert are revealed to 
Gawain, the women are turned to objects. When the Lady exits the magic circle 




voiceless lady of the house who cannot speak for herself, while Morgan’s status is 
diminished to that of a “guest.”24 Throughout the entirety of Fitt IV, the Lady is silent 
while the true game-master, Morgan, and the pseudo-host, Bertilak, tell Gawain of their 
roles in the fabrication of the “Crystemas gomen” (SGGK line 283). Although Bertilak’s 
claims of power during his revelation to Gawain are false, he speaks for his wife, treating 
her as though she possesses just as little power as the silent Guenevere, “Arthur’s token,” 
presents at the beginning of the poem (Fisher 79).25 Despite the silence of the Lady in the 
final fitt and the silence of Morgan throughout the mass of the text, the success of the 
overarching godgame serves as proof of the success of these women in assuming the 
masculine role of manipulator. While their silence in the final fitt of the poem may 
categorize them as “non-person[s],” it is precisely in this lack of culturally-defined 
personhood that they derive their power, and it is the masculinity of this power paired 




24 Tison Pugh writes that godgames, “whether secular or spiritual in their setting, often assume 
overtones of redemption as their protagonists are reborn into their new identities,” and that this 
redemption often presents itself as the firm reestablishment of a character’s heteronormative 
identity (137-38). The Lady’s shift in control within SGGK serves as a direct reflection of this 
concept. Despite her complete control over the gamespace of the bedroom, by the final fitt of the 
poem, the Lady returns to her feminine, passive, and silent role as the wife of Lord Bertilak.  
25 The poem ends with ambiguity surrounding the degree of the power that these women possess. 
While the Lady appears to lose the status of game-master once she leaves the realm of the 
bedroom, the primary game-master—Morgan la Faye—has remained silently veiled in the 
margins of the storyline throughout the entirety of the text. Therefore, any firm determination of 
Morgan’s power as defined by her silence in the final fitt would be misplaced. Instead, Morgan la 





Eve: Game-Master of Milton’s Panoptic Eden 
The story of John Milton’s Paradise Lost paints a picture of an all-knowing and 
all-powerful God who ventures to create a humanity that will ultimately rebel; it is a story 
nearly identical to the Biblical account of Genesis. Though the foundations of these 
stories are similar, they differ on a few fronts—one of the most notable of these being the 
character of the first woman, Eve. In both of these accounts, it is Eve who is said to 
disrupt order within the heterotopic26 Garden of Eden by means of her disobedience. 
Eve’s disobedience, and subsequent fall, is often understood as a product of her departure 
from the safety of her husband’s side, as the “impure condition”27 of her femininity 
 
26 The word “heterotopia” will be used throughout this chapter to refer to Michel Foucault’s 
concept of the panopticon—a specific type of heterotopic space. In his article entitled 
“Heterotopias,” published by the Architectural Association School of Architecture, Foucault 
describes the heterotopia as “spaces that are absolutely other,” and breaks these spaces up into the 
categories of biological heterotopias and heterotopias of deviation—the former being “privileged 
or sacred places [which] are generally reserved for individuals undergoing a ‘biological crisis,’ 
while the latter are more common spaces “that operate at the margins of society” such as nursing 
homes, psychiatric clinics, and prisons (20). A reading of this introduction into heterotopic spaces 
points us directly to Julia Kristeva’s abject. These spaces that exist on the “margins of society” 
and are “absolutely other” can be described as the same spaces in which the deject lives (Kristeva 
8). The liminality implied in both Foucault’s and Kristeva’s writings will become imperative to a 
reading of the Garden of Eden as a heterotopic panopticon. Furthermore, Foucault goes on to say 
that “perhaps the most ancient example of a heterotopia would be the garden, a creation which 
goes back thousands of years” (21). He describes the heterotopia as a place that must always 
“have a system of opening and closure which isolates them in relation to the surrounding space” 
which is entered “either because you’re forced to … or because you wish to submit to a ritual” 
(21). Keeping these foundational understandings of Foucault’s heterotopia in mind will become 
crucial to an understanding of the Garden’s function as a heterotopic panopticon, as a labyrinth, 
and, most certainly, as a gamespace.  
27 Norris references Aristotle’s Generation of Animals in her Eve: A Biography to discuss his 
understanding of the female’s innate status as a deformed and soulless human: “the female is as it 
were a deformed male; and the menstrual discharge is semen, though in an impure condition; i.e., 
it lacks one constituent, and one only, the principle of Soul … Thus the physical part, the body, 




leaves her vulnerable to the temptations of sin (qtd. in Norris 139). This understanding of 
the woman’s natural tendency toward sin is heavily dependent on a reading of the first 
woman as a lesser being created to fulfill a position of subordinance to her husband. This 
chapter will argue that, in pursuing a more literal translation of Eve’s introductory 
passages in the Biblical book of Genesis, a type of agency is granted to her character 
which is reflected in Milton’s epic. Without considering an alternate translation of the 
phrase ‘ēzer kenegdô (understood in Protestant texts28 to mean “help-meet) in the Biblical 
account of Eve’s translation, the Eve of Milton who pursues autonomy sits at a far divide 
from the seemingly submissive Eve of Genesis.  
This divide expands upon consideration of the Garden of Eden as a gamespace. 
The dominant/submissive, male/female binary which appears to be set up by the God of 
 
body” (qtd in 139). The conception of the woman as a lesser being, therefore, existed far before 
the rise of Christianity, and can therefore be understood as an influence on Christian ideology. 
Norris attributes “the widespread notion of female inferiority” present in Christian tradition to be 
significantly influenced by the Greek medical texts both of Aristotle and the Hippocratic writers 
(138).  
For more on Aristotle and women, see Daryl McGowan Tress’ “The Metaphysical Science of 
Aristotle's "Generation of Animals" and Its Feminist Critics.”  
28 Pamela Norris writes that, while “doctrinal reforms initiated by Luther and Calvin” actually 
pushed for a degree of equality among the creation of the sexes, “in the end, their revised 
readings of the Eden story simply confirmed woman’s subordinated status … in the Reformers’ 
view, Eve sinned and corrupted Adam through her independence, for which she was punished not 
only by the pain of repeated childbearing, but also by being placed under her husband’s 
domination” (28-81). John Calvin writes that what had once been “a gentle subjection” of Eve by 





Genesis29 is only superficially adhered to within Paradise Lost.30 Where Adam and Eve 
are initially perceived to be perfect embodiments of this divine dualism, closer attention 
to the characters sculpted in Milton’s epic reveals humanity’s inability to maintain this 
holy standard. Eve’s inability to conform to this standard of femininity largely stems 
from her position of controlling power within this gamespace. Robert Rowdon Wilson 
refers to the individual in control of the gamespace within a text as “game-master,” 
writing that this figure holds the power to create rules by which the other game-players 
must abide. These rules have the power to entrap the “victim” of the godgame in what he 
perceives to be “a web of unintelligible incidents” (Wilson 8).The game-master of a 
godgame is able to exert control over a game-space from beyond the players’ perceptions, 
thereby leading these players—by means of subtle manipulation—throughout the 
conceptual labyrinth of which the game is comprised. Specifically, Eve employs her 
 
29 A reading of Genesis often results in an understanding of a divinely ordained binary system 
that separates the sexes by their individual duties. Joy Ladin writes in “The Genesis of Gender,” 
“Of course, by specifically creating humanity ‘male and female’— by singling out that difference 
among all the variations characteristic of human bodies—God has laid the foundation of the 
gender binary, which ascribes different roles, characteristics, feelings, desires, and so on to men 
and to women. But in the first chapter of Genesis, differences in genitalia and secondary sex 
characteristics have not yet been translated into differences in roles and identities. But though 
little at this point rides on being male or female, these verses establish that humanity can be 
understood in terms of that binary” (41). Therefore, no matter which creation story is read from 
the Book of Genesis [by this I mean the creation story of Chapter 1 which serves as an account of 
God’s creation of life “from chaos by divine command” or that of Chapter 2 which focuses on the 
creation of the first man from dust and the first woman from her appointed husband’s side  
(Oxford English Dictionary 11)], a binary system is set in place where the male exists opposite of 
the female.  
30 It is crucial to consider the very structure of binaries. Hélène Cixious argues that “it is the first 
term in the pair which enjoys a privileged, or power, position” leaving the second term to be 
“seen as the opposite of the first [and thereby] relegated to a status which has negative 
connotations, simply because it isn’t the first term, but its ‘other,’ and is therefore alien and 




pseudo-adherence to God’s standard of femininity in order to veil the true controlling 
power she possesses over her husband, and, by extension, the game-space as a whole. 
The first woman’s position as game-master prevents her from conforming to the dualistic 
power structure of the dominant masculinity/submissive femininity which is read into this 
sacred text, thereby requiring that she exist outside of the strict parameters of the 
subordinate position of “help-meet” to which she is delegated by the creation myths of 
Genesis.31 In her autonomy, Eve fulfills the commanding role that God delegates to 
Adam—and therefore to the masculine—within both Genesis and Milton’s Paradise 
 
31 It is often believed that, because Adam was formed first and Eve from his body (or essence), 
Eve must necessarily be a lesser reflection of divinity than her appointed husband. Though 
legitimate interpretations of the Hebrew texts exist which justify the equal creation of the first 
man and woman [which can be seen as the male and female are said to be created simultaneously 
“in [God’s] own image (Gen. 1.27)], the formation of the masculine/feminine power structure 
based off of a reading of these creation myths “has been appropriated in hegemonic discourse,” 
thereby suppressing the female under the façade of divine ordination (Tuttle 56). 
There are multiple readings of the Biblical text which combat the concept of the woman’s innate 
inferiority. In her book Helpmates, Harlots, and Heroes: Women’s Stories in the Hebrew Bible, 
Alice Ogden Bellis lays out numerous critical readings which do just this. Her second chapter 
“The Story of Eve” lists ten critics, scholars, and theorists with unorthodox readings of Eve’s 
story and purpose: Phyllis Trible, Mieke Bal, Susan Lanser, David Freedman, Mary Callaway & 




Lost.32 In fracturing this dualistic power structure33 Eve is granted the opportunity to 
assume the controlling role of game-master of the labyrinthine gamespace she inhabits.34 
 
32 After humanity’s Fall from Grace in both Genesis and Paradise Lost, God distributes curses 
separately to men and women. The biblical account reads:  
“To the woman he said: ‘I shall give you great labour in childbearing; with labour you 
will bear children. You will desire your husband but he will be your master.’ And to the 
man he said: ‘Because you have listened to your wife and eaten from the tree which I 
forbade you, on your account the earth will be cursed. You will get your food from it 
only by labour all the days of your life; it will yield thorns and thistles for you. You will 
eat of the produce of the field, and only by the sweat of your brow will you return to the 
earth; for from it you were taken. Dust you are, to dust you will return’” (Gen. 3.16-19). 
Milton’s account of the curses reads:  
And to the woman thus his sentence turned / Thy sorrow I will greatly multiply / By thy 
conception; children thou shalt bring / In sorrow forth; and to thy husband’s will / Thy 
shall submit; he over thee shall rule: / On Adam last thus judgement he pronounc’d. / 
Because thou. Hast hearken’d to the voice of thy wife / And eaten of the tree, concerning 
which / I charg’d thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat therof: / Curs’d is the ground for thy 
sake; thou in sorrow / Sha eat thereof all the days of thy life, / Thorns also and thistles it 
shall bring thee forth / Unbid; and thou shalt eat th’herb of the field, / In the sweat of thy 
face shalt thou eat bread, / Till thou return unto the ground; for thou / Out of the ground 
was taken, know thy birth / For dust thou art, and shalt to dust return” (Milton lines 192-
208). 
Therefore, in both accounts, Eve is cursed to submit to her husband’s controlling power (this 
status privileges his position in the gender binary). However, the difference lies in Eve’s desire. 
God says that Eve of Genesis will pine for a husband who will rule over her (Gen. 3.16) while 
Milton’s God merely commands Eve to submit to her husband’s will (X.195-96).  
33 In refusing to submit to her husband’s power as both the biblical and Miltonic Gods demand, 
Eve moves toward the masculine pole of the gender binary—one of power. Michel Foucault’s 
The History of Sexuality defines power relations as “the immediate effects of the divisions, 
inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in” relationships, and, therefore, power 
relationships depend “on a multiplicity of points of resistance” (The History of Sexuality 94-95). 
With this understanding of power relationships in mind, power relationships certainly exist on 
multiple levels within the Garden of Eden, including between Adam and Eve. Adam is not in the 
place of power throughout much of Paradise Lost—despite the divine command that he rule over 
his wife—thereby removing Eve from the secondary position within the binary power system and 
placing her in the privileged position of power.  
34 In Robert Rowden Wilson’s discussion of the godgame, he writes that, within literature, there 
exists two types of labyrinthine games: physical (or weak) labyrinths and conceptual (or strong) 
labyrinths. This research will reveal the instances in Paradise Lost wherein both labyrinthine 




If Eve is understood as Adam’s equal, as opposed to merely his subordinate helper, a 
reading of Paradise Lost from a Literary Game Theory perspective makes Eve not 
merely the femme fatale who introduces sin and death into the world, but rather a game-
master in the pursuit of individuality and knowledge.35 Though an alternate reading of the 
first woman’s purpose may not reconcile equality among the sexes within the biblical 
Book of Genesis, it does reveal a similarity in autonomy between Milton’s Eve and the 
Eve of Genesis, suggesting that Milton’s first woman may indeed coincide with the Eve 
of the Bible.  
The first book of the Hebrew Bible presents the Judeo-Christian understanding of 
creation. God brings the world into being and populates it with the first man and 
woman—though not necessarily in this order. The Creation myth found in the first 
chapter of Genesis is referred to as the Priestly tradition. In this account, humans are 
created simultaneously; the male and female are created at once and are both said to have 
been formed in the image of God.36 The language in this text reflects a sense of unity 
between the first parents that is wholly lacking in the Yahwist tradition. This tradition is 
found in the second chapter of Genesis and presents a more power-centric account of the 
Creation. This etiology accounts for the first human being’s37 creation from the dust38 
while the ‘ēzer kenegdô, who is later named Eve, was formed from the body of the ʼâdam 
 
35 For a more in-depth background to the study of Literary Game Theory as a whole (as opposed 
to this specific focus on the godgame), refer to Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens and Katie Salen’s 
and Eric Zimmermans’s Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals.   
36 Genesis 1.27 
37 I say “first human being” here because the same term— ʼâdam—is used to refer to God’s first 
human creation as is used to refer to mankind as a whole. For this reason, it does not necessarily 
signify sex.  




who the reader comes to know as Adam (Bellis 37). If the Hebrew Bible is to be read in 
the order that it has been compiled, the opening passages of Genesis necessarily frame 
the way all following passages of scripture are understood. It is, therefore, largely the 
early creation myths of Genesis that determine the woman’s place in Judeo-Christian 
societies, as these myths have been interpreted as references of divine justification for the 
unequal treatment of the sexes. Because Eve’s position as game-master of Eden is 
specific to a prelapsarian Eden—as she comes to control the gamespace of the Garden in 
order to achieve the free will which the forbidden fruit promises—it is necessary to look 
toward the language surrounding her inception in attempts to justify the gaming Eve of 
Milton with that of biblical tradition. Considering the prelapsarian purposes that God 
intends his creation to serve reveals both God’s ideal functions of his creation as well as 
the conditions under which Eve is able to achieve masculine controlling power.39 
 The orthodox view of the role of the first woman of Christian creation mythology 
heavily relies on the translation of ‘ēzer kenegdô as “help-meet.”40 This translation 
presents the first woman as innately subordinate by divine will and stands as her only 
noteworthy character trait leading up to the Fall. Though readers know her name to be 
 
39 Because control is delegated to the man in Christian tradition while the woman is expected to 
remain submissive to this power (see God’s curses from Genesis as a foundation), controlling 
power is deemed a masculine quality. Eve’s fracturing of the gender dichotomy through her 
assumption of this masculine power proves a lack of natural connection between a creation’s sex 
and its capacity for power and control. Despite this, the word “masculine” is used here as a 
necessary signifier.   
40 Strong’s Concordance defines ‘ēzer kenegdô (as found in Genesis 2:18) as two separate terms: 
 .neged, neh'-ghed; from H5046; a front, i.e ֶנֶגד“ ʻêzer, ay'-zer; from H5826; aid:—help” and ֵעֶזר“
part opposite; specifically a counterpart, or mate; usually (adverbial, especially with preposition) 
over against or before:—about, (over) against.” These terms have been interpreted in the KJV text 




Eve, the first woman of Genesis is only referred to as ‘ishshah41 until after eating of the 
Tree of Knowledge and initiating the Fall of Man (Oxford Study Bible, Gen. 3.20). It is, 
therefore, not until after dooming mankind to live in sin and experience death that Eve 
receives a name. Eve’s decision to eat of the tree is what grants her identity in the biblical 
account. The Fall of Man and the sin of woman have come to be understood as one in the 
same, irrefutably linking the woman’s identity with death within Christian tradition.42 In 
the apocryphal Ecclesiasticus (otherwise known as the Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach), it 
is written that “Sin began with a woman, / and because of her we all die” (Ecclus. 25.24). 
Genesis, therefore, presents two significant moments in the forging of Eve’s identity: the 
first in her creation and the second in her postlapsarian naming. If the traditional 
reading43 of the holy text is maintained, the first woman is created as an assistant to her 
husband, communicating an innate weakness requiring subordination and male guidance. 
However, her identity is further forged by Eve’s eating of the forbidden fruit—
demonstrating her capacity for danger—in her postlapsarian naming.  Therefore, Eve’s 
identity can no longer be fully defined by the weak and submissive characteristics that the 
translation of her creation as Adam’s “help-meet” suggest. Because Eve’s naming comes 
 
41 Strong’s Concordance defines ה  ,ʼishshâh (H802) as “a woman:—(adulter)ess, each, every ִאשָּׁ
female, many, one, one, together, wife, woman. Often unexpressed in English.” The term is Eve’s 
only signifier until after the Fall when she is named ַחוָּׁה Chavvâh (H2331)—“life-giver.” 
42 The apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus states that “From a woman sin had its beginning, and 
because of her we all die” (Oxford Study Bible  Ecc. 25.24). This concept exists also in the 
Christian Bible: 1 Timothy 2:13-14 reads “For Adam was formed first, then Eve, and Adam was 
not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor.”  
43 Again, the tradition that this research refers to is Christian Protestantism because of the 
positioning of Milton’s writing during the Protestant Reformation in England. Though this 
version of Protestantism is vastly complex—and largely Catholic during certain periods—this 
chapter must choose a theological focus, and therefore looks to Milton’s conversion from 




after the sin that ultimately comes to define her, her capacity for power must be 
recognized—whether this power be understood as admirable or hazardous.   
These two opposing interpretations of Eve’s identity in the creation myth requires 
a reading of Eve as either villainous or as complex. Where her naming as “Mother of 
Creation” comes after her decision to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, 
her creation as a “help-meet” insists that she should not be allowed the autonomy 
necessary to make this decision. While Eve’s eating of the fruit has traditionally been 
understood as a reflection of female irrationality (as decisions made by women result in 
death), a handful of biblical scholars and literary critics have presented alternate readings 
of Eve’s creation as ‘ēzer kenegdô which resolve the disparity surrounding her identity in 
ways that more easily relate her to the Eve of Milton. Among these scholars is David 
Freedman. In his paper, “Woman, a Power Equal to Man,” Freedman rejects the 
“customary translation of these two words [‘ēzer kenegdô], despite its near universal 
adoption,” and dissects this unique and climacteric phrase into something more fitting for 
the context: a power equal to man (2). Freedman writes that the popular translation of this 
phrase is founded within the conflation of terms. The evolution of language between 
1500 and 1200 B.C.E. resulted in the merging of ‘ēzer’s two roots, thereby demanding a 
merging of meaning as well (Freedman 3). Before the conflation of terms, the “word 
‘ēzer could mean either ‘to save’ (‘-z-r) or ‘to be strong’ (ǵ-z-r)” (3). Despite the power 
these two terms connote, ‘ēzer’s meaning was reduced to the subordinate “to help” in 




in the Hebrew Bible, 44 the term kenegdô only appears once in the Bible’s entirety and is 
specific to the first woman. Where translators have considered this word to mean 
“appropriate” or “fit for,” Freedman states that neged is used in “later Mishnaic Hebrew” 
to mean “equal,” thereby suggesting that the history of kenegdô’s translation is severely 
lacking in accuracy (5). When these two words are combined, the phrase can be 
understood as either “a savior equal to” or “a strength equal to.” However, Freedman 
does away with the former interpretation, writing that God “is surely not creating this 
creature to be the man’s savior,” but rather to “relieve [his] loneliness” (4). Although 
Eve’s creation as Adam’s savior does not seem to hold any significant weight, her 
creation as “a power (or strength) superior to the animals”—and therefore equal to 
Adam—is certainly fitting (Freedman 4). Of its twenty-one appearances in the Hebrew 
Bible, ‘ēzer is used to refer to God seventeen times, to collective man two times, and to 
Eve twice (“H5828-‘ezer). In fact, the only instances of this word in the Book of Genesis 
refer to Eve, not to God.45 The knowledge that Eve is described in Genesis with the same 
language used to describe the almighty creator God throughout the biblical narrative 
informs the reader that Eve is far from lacking in power and therefore must have been 
endowed by her Creator with a purpose beyond mere subordination to her husband.  
 
44 In the KJV, the appearances of ֵעֶזר ʻêzer and its subject are as follows: Gen. 2.18, Eve; Gen. 
2.20, Eve; Exod. 18.4, God; Deu. 33.7, God; Deu. 33.26, God; Deu. 33.29, God; Ps. 20.2, God; 
Ps. 33.20, God; Ps. 70.5, God; Ps. 89.19, God; Ps. 115.10; Ps. 115.11, God; Ps. 121.1, God; Ps. 
121.2, God; Ps. 124.8, God; Psalm 146.5, God; Isa. 30.5, men; Ezek. 12.14, God; Dan. 11.34, 
men; Hos. 13.9, God.  




Similar to Freedman’s understanding of ‘ēzer kenegdô as “a power equal to man,” 
Hemchand Gossai argues that God’s decision to create a companion so that the 'ādām46 
would not later become lo tov in his loneliness, was focused on the creation of “one who 
is comparable in strength and not precisely and necessarily one of opposite gender” (546, 
emphasis added).47 In other words, the creation of a companion for the 'ādām has a 
greater focus on the similarities between the 'ādām and the companion than it does on 
differences. Once it is determined that a “suitable partner” does not exist among the 
created animals, God decides that it is best for the human to live “in human community,” 
and is therefore prompted to create the ‘ēzer kenegdô (Gen. 2.20, Gossai 546). If the 
woman is created for companionship and not submission, the autonomous Eve presented 
in Milton coincides more naturally with the ‘ēzer kenegdô of Genesis as she is granted an 
identity independent of her husband. Phyllis Trible’s reading of the Genesis account also 
allows for a more autonomous Eve. In order to avoid the negative connotations of the 
term “help-meet,” Trible translates ‘ēzer kenegdô to mean “a companion corresponding 
to” Adam, in other words a being of the same status” (Bellis 40, Norris 19-20).48 This 
simple adjustment in translation demands much less of the text than Freedman’s 
translation. Trible does not ask that the orthodox Christian reader transform his view of 
Eve from submissive to dominant, but instead simply suggests that the woman was 
 
ַדם 46  ,ʼâdam, aw-dam'; from H119; ruddy i.e. a human being (an individual or the species אָּׁ
mankind, etc.).  
47 While the ʼâdam was considred “very good,” his existence outside of human community is “not 
good,” or lo tov (Gossai 545, 546). 
48 Pamela Norris uses Trible’s translation as a base for her argument in her book Eve: A 
Biography. She writes that the popular interpretation of the role of Eve as man’s subordinate 
helper loses the intent of the phrase ‘ēzer kenegdô altogether, suggesting the phrase’s foundations 




created as an equal partner. Even this slight modification of perspective vastly alters the 
way that Eve’s purpose is presented in the Christian story of creation. If Eve is indeed 
intended by God to exist as “‘a companion corresponding to’ Adam,” then she is not 
created solely with the purpose of being subdued, as the popular translation of “help-
meet” suggests (Norris 20). If Trible’s reading of Genesis is considered, the 
understanding of Eve as reliant on Adam cannot stand. Trible writes that Eve actively 
acts as Adam’s representative while speaking to the serpent while Adam stays passive—
“listening, but not speaking” and accepting the forbidden fruit without question (Bellis 
41). The recognition of Eve as the decision-maker of the relationship raises her out of the 
subordinate status of “helper” and insists that she be read as a reasonable character with 
her own volition.  
The differentiations between these three readings of the ‘ēzer kenegdô are slight; 
Freedman’s focuses on power and strength, Gossai’s focuses on community, and Trible’s 
focuses on equality, but all three are grounded in the notion of similarity as a necessary 
aspect of companionship. If the 'ādām has his own individual identity, so must the ‘ēzer 
kenegdô formed from his essence. Ester Sowernam actually considers Eve to be a more 
complete creation than her husband, arguing that Eve’ birthplace within the Garden of 
Eden identifies her as a Paraditian Creature (qtd. in Miller 50). Because Eve was formed 
in Paradise from corporeal material, she is purer than the 'ādām who was formed from the 
dirt before the Garden was established.49 Any reading of Eve’s identity as founded in a 
 
49 The second chapter of Genesis reads “The Lord God formed a human being from the dust of 
the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, so that he became a living creature. 
The Lord God planted a garden in Eden away to the east, and in it he put the man he had formed” 
(Oxford Study Bible Gen. 2.7-8). The Garden of Eden, therefore, was not created until someone 




place outside of Adam establishes an identity separate from her husband, thereby 
demanding that be understood as an equal (at the very least) companion to her husband 
instead of as a subordinate helper. This necessitating of the female’s individual identity 
and consequent equality between the first parents cannot exist within the boundaries of 
the orthodox hierarchal system which privileges the male.50 Where orthodox Judeo-
Christian theology looks to Eve’s eating of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil 
as proof of her lesser status, these scholars provide opportunities to understand her 
character from different perspectives. Instead of viewing her eating of the fruit “as 
indicative of the evil and subordinate nature of women,” these critics are able to read the 
life of Eve through a hermeneutical lens that insists equality (Bellis 4). There is no reason 
to believe that Eve was naturally more inclined to fall than was her partner, and therefore 
 
50  In her “modern feminist biblical criticism,” Phyllis Trible “articulated the prefeminist 
consensus about Adam and Eve” (qtd. in Bellis 39). Her list is as follows: 
- “A male God creates first man (Gen. 2.7) and last woman (2.22); first means superior and 
last means inferior or subordinate. 
- “Woman is created for the sake of man: a helpmate to cure his loneliness (2.18-23). 
- “Contrary to nature, woman comes out of a man; she is denied even her natural function 
of birthing and that function is given to man (2.21-22). 
- “Woman is the rib of man, dependent upon him for life (2.21-22). 
- “Taken out of man (2.23), woman has a derivative, not an autonomous, existence. 
- “Man names woman (2.23) and thus has power over her. 
- “Man leaves his father’s family in order to set up through his wife another patriarchal 
unit (2.24). 
- “Woman tempted man to disobey, and thus she is responsible for sin in the world (3.6); 
she is untrustworthy, gullible, and simple-minded. 
- “Woman is cursed by pain in childbirth (3.16); pain in childbirth is a more severe 
punishment than man’s struggles with the soil; it signifies that woman’s sin is greater 
than man’s. 
- “Woman’s desire for man (3.16) is God’s way of keeping her faithful and submissive to 
her husband. 
- “God gives man the right to rule over woman (3.16)” (qtd. in Bellis 39). 
These prefeminist beliefs about the divine right of man’s domination over her husband are 




no reason to believe that she possessed a greater capacity for evil than Adam. With this in 
mind, Eve’s eating of the tree becomes less of a proof of moral deficiency and more so 
that of a desire for knowledge, and this desire becomes even more clear when analyzing 
the marital power structure present in Paradise Lost.  
Although not a holy book, John Milton’s Paradise Lost has greatly contributed to 
and complicated cultural conceptions of the Christian creation myth. Whether 
purposefully or not, Milton shapes a multifaceted Eve in his epic poem. Because this 
Eve’s words cannot be trusted to match her actions, there is no singular representation of 
women in Paradise Lost.51 Milton’s Eve loosely reflects the traditional Eve of Genesis, 
differing in her humanization—developing her into the round and complex character that 
the first woman must have been, as opposed to the flat and dull femme fatale that has 
been exploited as a scapegoat for sin since the Bible’s conception. Milton artfully takes 
the limited verses related to Eve in the first chapters of Genesis and expands them into an 
account much more reflective of intricate human experience. The orthodox biblical 
standards of masculine and feminine roles are certainly presented in Paradise Lost but 
exist only artificially. Milton’s Eve presents herself to her husband as a doting, loyal, and 
completely devoted wife whose purpose is only to serve her “author, and disposer,” while 
Adam plays the role of powerful leader and commander of life in Eden (Milton IV.635). 
These two do their best to present themselves as fulfillments of God’s holy standard, but 
are, in reality, ill-equipped for the task. While Eve appears to have been born with the sin 
 
51 As will be discussed further, Eve makes a habit of confessing her whole-hearted devotion and 
submission to her husband while acting in ways that suggest that these declarations are intended 




of selfish ambition, Adam was created an effeminate man, unable to faithfully choose the 
will of God over the beauty of his wife.  
The superficiality of the biblical gender roles presented by Milton materialize in 
Adam through his inability to achieve divine masculinity. Although both Adam and Eve 
are described as “erect and tall, / Godlike erect, with native honour clad, / In naked 
majesty seem’d lords of all,” it is only Adam who was formed to rule and protect, and it 
is his “inability to uphold his manhood in the face of Eve’s feminine attractiveness” for 
which the Son chastises the postlapsarian Adam (Milton IV.288-90, Lehnhof 67): The 
Son says to Adam: 
… to her 
Thou didst resign thy manhood, and the place 
Wherein God set thee above her, made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection far excell’d 
Hers in all real dignity. (Milton X.147-51) 
Here, the Son very clearly presents the position God intends Eve to fill: she is made from 
Adam, for Adam, and is therefore innately subject to his manhood. However, throughout 
the whole of Paradise Lost, Adam is unable to maintain this holy standard of masculinity 
for which he is created.52 Despite being formed with a “fair large front and eye sublime 
[that] declar’d / Absolute rule,” Adam proves incapable of satisfying this dominant role 
on a practical level as he consistently yields to the wishes of his wife (Milton IV.300-01). 
Though Eve is the first to eat of the tree, it is “man’s effeminate slackness” that allows 
 
52 It can therefore be argued, as does Kent Lenhof’s “Performing Masculinity in Paradise Lost,” 
that Eve’s inability to maintain God’s standard of the ideal feminine is due to Adam’s failure to 




sin into the world (Milton XI.634, emphasis added). Man, intended to shield the innately 
wanton woman “beneath his shoulders broad,” falls into effeminacy and misses the mark 
(Milton IV.303). Similarly, Eve fails to genuinely uphold the feminine qualities of 
subjection and compliance, preferring to instead attempt to achieve the dominant role 
intended for her husband (Milton IV.308-11).  
While Adam was created “for God only, [Eve] for God in him,” Eve’s beauty and 
subservience to her husband come to serve as indispensable components of the divine 
standard of the feminine (Milton IV.299). When Satan ascends to the Garden, Milton’s 
narrator describes the image of humanity, displaying the naked Eve as beautiful and 
delicate, shielded beneath her husband’s broad shoulders: 
She, as a veil, down to the slender waist 
Her unadorned golden tresses wore 
Dishevell’d, but in wanton ringlets wav’d 
As the vine curls her tendrils, which implie 
Subjection, but requir’d with gentle sway 
And by her yielded, by him best receiv’d, 
Yielded with coy submission, modest pride, 
And sweet reluctant amorous delay. (Milton IV.304-311) 
This description of Eve instantly complicates the blamelessness of her character. In this 
prelapsarian paradise, humanity has not yet tasted sin and should therefore still be 
faultless. However, this description of Eve contains overtly sexualized language. Milton’s 
narrator describes Eve as playfully manipulative with her sexuality. The subjection that 




modest pride, / And sweet reluctant amorous delay” (Milton IV.310-11). The idea that 
Eve would withhold her body from her husband suggests an attitude of sexuality as 
gameplay, not for mutual gain, but rather as a means of influence.53 After all, it is Adam’s 
vulnerability to Eve’s “feminine charm” that leads him to eat of the forbidden tree (Smith 
396). Despite her seemingly deficient creation, Adam cannot help but recognize a kind of 
completeness in his wife to which he cannot relate. 
Adam’s description of his immediate infatuation with his wife’s beauty refers not 
only to her physicality, but also to this broader sense of indescribable completeness. 
Adam’s infatuation with his wife’s outward beauty is notable here, as he struggles to 
reconcile his overwhelming attraction to Eve with the supposed truth of her lesser status. 
Adam recognizes that Eve was formed from his own body and should therefore exist as a 
lesser version of himself. Despite this knowledge, Adam relates his initial estimation of 
her as one of absolute awe: 
… yet when I approach 
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems, 
And in herself complete, so well to know 
Her own, that what she wills to do or say 
Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best (Milton VIII.546-50) 
Though she is formed “from [his] side subducting,” Eve appears to Adam as whole in a 
way that he is not (Milton VIII.536). Eve is said to be Adam’s inferior “in the mind / And 
inward faculties” as well as outwardly, as she less directly reflects “His image who 
 
53 While this coy approach to sexuality does not necessarily demand manipulative control, it 




made” her (Milton VIII.541-44). Despite this, Adam recognizes a fullness within his wife 
that is not solely concerned with her beauty, again harkening back to Sowernam’s 
understanding of Eve as a Paraditian Creature. While Adam was created from the 
primordial dirt, Eve was created from life within Paradise. Sowernam implies that it is 
therefore Eve’s purity, not her moral deficiency, that leads her to desire “intellectual 
food,” suggesting that the orthodox understanding of Eve’s divinely ordained 
subservience is not reflective of the Miltonic Eve (Milton IX.768).  
In her wholeness as a Paraditian Creature, the Eve of Milton is far from the 
archetypal Christian wife and would therefore fit much more seamlessly into Judeo-
Christian tradition if an alternate consideration of Eve’s purpose in creation were to be 
considered. Freedman, Gossai, and Trible all grant the first woman a degree of autonomy, 
but it is the latter that is the easiest to apply here. While Freedman’s and Gossai’s 
readings of Eve grant her strength, Trible simply considers the ‘ēzer kenegdô to be “a 
companion corresponding to” Adam, thereby demanding a lesser divergence from 
orthodoxy than would the two former readings (Bellis 40). However, this is not to say 
that Freedman’s and Gossai’s readings lack legitimacy. While Milton’s account of the 
Fall of Man certainly does not present divinely ordained equality among the sexes, it does 
present Eve as powerful, not in spite of her femininity, but because of it. The idea that 
Eve’s femininity does not serve as a hindrance to wholeness in the way that her 
husband’s does directly opposes the traditional presentation of Eve in the Book of 
Genesis. If the purpose of Eve’s creation is to serve as Adam’s help-meet, she is 
necessarily born into a subordinate position. Therefore, the partnership between the first 




the creation myth and the epic. Trible’s understanding of ‘ēzer kenegdô allows for the 
easiest transition from orthodoxy and will therefore serve as the primary reference point 
for an alternate translation, though Freedman’s emphasis on power proves to be 
significant as well. An evaluation of Genesis with either of these translations in mind 
forces a more complicated reading of the biblical first woman and ultimately allows for a 
closer parallel between the biblical and Miltonic Eves.  
When considering the Miltonic Eve to be one who possesses masculine 
controlling power and therefore is able to take on the role of game-master within the 
Garden, a reconsideration of what qualifies as gaming becomes necessary. In their book 
entitled Rules of Play—Game Design Fundamentals, Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman 
devote a chapter to defining the game. In order to do so, these authors first separate the 
concepts of “play” and “game.” While some theories consider games to be “a subsest of 
play,” others consider play as “a component of games” (Salen 2). The line separating 
what qualifies as “play” versus what qualifies as “game” is blurred to say the least, and 
the game theorists who attempt to clarify this boundary largely contradict one another. 
For this reason, Salen and Zimmerman alter previous theorists’ conceptions of play and 
game to create their own definition of gaming. They write, “A game is a system in which 
players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that results in a quantifiable 
outcome” (11). While the Garden of Eden is certainly not artificial for Adam and Eve, it 
may be defined that way by God, as it is his created space. The idea that true experience 
versus artifice is dependent on perspective is prevalent in Robert Rawdon Wilson’s 
“Godgames and Labyrinths: The Logic of Entrapment.” This text focuses around not only 




godgame has a complete, omniscient perspective unattainable to his creation. Wilson’s 
godgame therefore serves as the perfect parallel to Milton’s Garden of Eden. Specifically, 
Wilson’s writing discusses the areas of overlap between a labyrinth and a game, focusing 
on its two expressions: the weak and the strong textual labyrinth. Here, the weak 
labyrinth is a mere “mimic [construction] of words of walls, corridors, passageways, and 
rooms,” while strong labyrinths “are constructed out of alternatives, choices, a series of 
decisions, symmetrically opposed sets of criteria” (Wilson 11-12).54 While the strong, or 
conceptual, labyrinth is always a game, the weak, or physical, labyrinth cannot be a game 
in and of itself, as the structure does not inherently promote gameplay. It is only when a 
player is inserted into the structure—by his own volition or otherwise—that the labyrinth 
gains a capacity for gameplay. The maze-treader becomes the victim of a godgame upon 
realization of entrapment, playing the game as he “struggles to understand the rules of the 
game in which [he] has been made a piece” (Wilson 8). Milton’s Paradise Lost is 
composed of a combination of both strong, conceptual labyrinths and weak, physical 
labyrinths. Throughout the text, physical labyrinthine spaces overlap and intertwine with 
conceptual “mind-mazes,” thereby producing a complex gamespace that can only be 
initiated by divinity (Wilson 12). Wilson’s godgame is predicated upon this concept of 
mental manipulation, therefore requiring that “the strong labyrinth is invariably a 
godgame” (14). Wilson writes, 
A godgame occurs in literature when one or more characters creates an 
illusion, a mazelike sequence of false accounts, that entraps another 
 
54 Simply put, the weak labyrinth is a physical structure and the strong labyrinth is a mental 
labyrinth. While the weak (physical) labyrinth can function as a game, it cannot do so without 




character. The entrapped character finds himself entangled in the threads 
of (from his point of view) an incomprehensible strategy plotted by 
another character who (thus) takes on the roles both of a game-maker, 
since he invents rules for the other character to follow, and of a god as 
well. (Wilson 6-7) 
Though the Edenic space in Milton’s account appears to be real, it is an illusion insofar as 
it is sustainable. God himself, “from his prospect high,” foresees the Fall of Man (Milton 
III.77). Given his dwelling place “wherein past, present, and future hide,” God is aware 
of the fate of the first parents even before their creation (Milton III.78). In forming 
mankind despite his “high foreknowledge” of their inevitable fall and in placing them 
within the game-space of the Garden of Eden, God appears to be purposely entrapping 
his creation in “a maze-like sequence of false accounts” (Milton III.116). Because of the 
Creator-creation relationship seen here, Milton’s Garden of Eden serves as the most 
literal example of Wilson’s godgame.55 Where Wilson describes the god-like controlling 
power of the game-master of the godgame, Milton’s epic presents a literal God figure 
with the ability to create life from chaos on a whim, thereby forcing his creation into his 
created game-space. Adam and Eve are therefore unwitting gameplayers, as they have no 
knowledge of the game being played, nor do they have a choice but to participate.   
It is crucial to note Wilson’s use of the term “maze” in his definition of the 
godgame, as he employs it nearly interchangeably with “labyrinth” throughout his 
discussion. Wilson writes: 
 
55 Of God as a game-master, Steven J. Brams writes that “God is a ‘superlative strategist,’ but 
having granted free will to His human subjects (which justifies a game-theoretic treatment), He is 




This doublenesss seems essential to an understanding of labyrinths: 
bending, infolding, perplexing are the characteristic labyrinthine 
transformations of space. If labyrinths can be thought of as games, then 
their constitutive rule must express an analogous twofold function. I think 
that there is little doubt that this is so: a strong labyrinth compels a player 
(the victim within) to experience a bending of apparently straight lines, a 
perplexing of space, even while he, in playing back, attempts to straighten 
them. (Wilson 18) 
This necessary “doubleness” of the conceptual labyrinth allows for the gamespace to 
function as a maze with “blind alleys [and] enforced turns” to the victim, while 
simultaneously a labyrinth with a singular possible path from the perspective of the 
game-master (Doob 83).56 Wilson is therefore able to conflate the terms “maze” and 
“labyrinth” because of the “inherent duality” the structure possesses when read as a 
godgame (Doob 39). Milton’s Garden of Eden is sculpted and patrolled by God himself. 
From his lofty throne, God enjoys an aerial view of the gamespace, and, in his 
omnipotence, he is able to “perplex” the details of this space how he pleases. Although 
the victims of the godgame—Adam and Eve—experience Eden as a maze comprised of 
“forked paths[and] internal choices,” God’s all-knowing nature allows him to see the path 
that will be taken, thereby granting him the labyrinthine perspective (Doob 40). God’s 
 
56 A “maze” is typically considered to be a multicursal structure, while the “labyrinth” has only a 
single path. However, the OED conflates the terms, even going as far to include “a labyrinth” 
within the definition of a maze. While the labyrinth is defined as a physical structure, the maze 
can also be understood as a verb, meaning “to be delirious or bewildered; to be distraught; to be 
unsettled or incoherent in one’s mind” harkening back to the idea of conceptual entrapment (OED 




omnipotence allows him an aerial view of the “maze” alongside the ability to close off 
passageways in order to lead the game-player in the direction he pleases. The 
categorization of the gamespace of Eden as either mazelike or labyrinthine relies entirely 
on perspective—the more powerful the character, the more comprehensive his view of 
the gamespace, and the more unicursal the path appears to be.57 About the conceptual 
aspect of labyrinthine entrapment, Penelope Doob writes that “[w]hat you see depends on 
where you stand,” and this emphasis on perspective allows the structure to function as 
both a maze and a labyrinth simultaneously (1). Doob goes on to say that this 
“doubleness” of the labyrinthine structure allows for simultaneous “order and disorder, 
clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, artistry and chaos” (1). Where the 
controlling god figure is able to view the structure as a unicursal labyrinth constructed by 
ordered artistry, the entrapped game-player can see only confusion and chaos. This direct 
parallel between the power positions presented in Wilson’s conception of the godgame 
and those present in Milton’s epic reveal that Eden truly does function as a gamespace, 
relying on a labyrinthine structure to entrap unwitting game-players. Because of the 
complete mental control that the “gamewright” of the strong labyrinth possesses over the 
gameplayers he has trapped, Wilson writes that “the reciprocity between godgames and 
strong labyrinths should be evident” (14). When the player is met with the 
 
57 Therefore, while God—the game-maker—possesses a completely clear, unicursal view of the 
entrapping structure, game-players do not. Eve and Satan both serve as perfect examples of game-
masters with limited perspectives. Just as in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, characters within 
Paradise Lost prove to function as game-masters and pawns simultaneously. So, while they may 
have a “comprehensive” view of their own game-space, their clarity is restricted to this restricted 
space. For example, once Eve eats of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, the very 
essence of the Garden of Eden is altered, as it is defiled by sin. In eating of the tree, the game of 





“symmetrically opposed sets of criteria” which construct the “forking paths of decision” 
of a strong labyrinth, he is not only entrapped in a mental labyrinth he cannot 
comprehend but is “a victim of a godgame” as well (Wilson 12, 14).  
When considering means of entrapment, it is helpful to look also toward Michel 
Foucault’s conception of the heterotopia—specifically considering his interpretation of 
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. The panopticon is a type of prison that eliminates privacy 
by employment of a seemingly omnipresent prison guard at the center of the carceral 
space. This structure perpetuates uncertainty, and even fear, within the minds of prisoners 
so as to maintain order, and is described by Foucault as a “cruel, ingenious cage” (9). 
Within the Garden of Eden, God is able to see the whole of his creation while 
maintaining invisibility as long as he pleases. God’s omnipotence allows him complete 
control of the space without necessitating he be physically present within it, and this 
distance allowed by divine power is what connects the rule of Milton’s God to the prison 
guard of Foucault’s panopticon:  
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the 
individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements 
are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted 
work of writing links the centre and periphery, in which power is 
exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchal figure, in 
which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed 
among living beings, the sick and the dead—all this constitutes a compact 




At its very core, the panopticon is a fear-based system of surveillance and control which 
relies on the omniscience of the supervisor. Foucault’s concept of the panopticon centers 
around the perfection of “the exercise of power,” and, therefore, the application of this 
concept to Milton’s text requires that the assertion and maintenance of hierarchal 
positions within the Garden of Eden become completely power-centric (9). Just as the 
guard at the center of the panopticon gazes down, unseen, onto the prisoners, God is able 
to observe his creation within the gamespace of Eden from an omniscient perspective, 
allowing the God of Eden to fulfill both requirements of Foucault’s panopticon: visibility 
and unverifiability (Foucault 6). The prisoner can always see (visibility) the guard’s 
watchtower but can never confirm (unverifiability) that he is actively being watched. In 
the same way, Adam and Eve know that their Creator has free reign over their home in 
Eden, but being that God, in his divinity, is so far removed from humanity, they can 
never be sure whether or not they are being observed. Because of his positioning outside 
of the perception of the gameplayers, Foucault’s guard—and, by extension, Milton’s 
God—becomes a game-master as he utilizes his unknowability as a means of mental 
manipulation and control. This gamemaster’s veiled positioning creates “an asymmetry 
of power … articulated through an asymmetry of visibility, the notion of ‘seeing without 
being seen’” (Werrett 63). His distance from the gameplayers makes him impossible to 
understand, and his omniscience makes him impossible to hide from. In this way, the 
game of control being played within the gamespace of Eden is much more over “the mind 
rather than the body”—over the mental rather than the physical (Ruth).  
This “power of mind over mind” central to the panopticon of Eden perfectly 




victim in a godgame finds himself caught in a trap, subjected to a web of unintelligible 
incidents which, from the god’s side, are merely cunningly opaque strategies,” the 
gameplayers in a godgame must necessarily function within a realm of intellectual 
uncertainty (Freud). In literature specifically, Wilson writes about “conceptual, or strong, 
labyrinths” that take place primarily in the mind and do not require a physical structure: 
They are purely conceptual mind-mazes of literature, corridors of doubt, 
passageways of perplexity, forking paths of decision, that underlie 
godgames, giving structure but not receiving it … Strong labyrinths are 
constructed out of alternatives, choices, a series of decisions, 
symmetrically opposed sets of criteria. (Wilson 12) 
Again, the gameplayer is entrapped in a “conceptual mind-[maze]” by an unknowable 
controlling figure (Wilson 12). He is “totally seen, without ever seeing,” just as is the 
panopticon’s inmate (Foucault 6). If the strong labyrinth relies on the same “conceptual 
vertigo” as Wilson’s godgame and the same “dissymmetry, disequilibruium, [and] 
difference” as Foucault’s panopticon, it can be said that the Garden of Eden functions a 
combination of the three (Wilson 8, Foucualt 6). The controlling figures within the 
Garden of Eden therefore fulfill take on the same power positions as Wilson’s god and 
Foucault’s guard through their employment of conceptual labyrinths, and it is with this 
understanding of the labyrinthine game-master that Eve’s manipulation of her husband 
turns from villainy to gameplay. God is the game-maker of the gamespace, as he is the 
creator of Eden, and therefore also serves as the primary game-master of the godgame of 
the Garden. Though God serves as the primary game-master, he is not the sole game-




watchtower takes on the governing role, Foucault writes that “[a]ny individual, taken 
almost at random, can operate the machine” of the watchtower (qtd. in Foucault 6). The 
purpose of the panoptic watchtower is to dissociate “the seen/being seen dyad,” and both 
Eve certainly accomplishes this on a metaphorical level, taking control of the panoptic 
machine as she successfully manipulates the events of Eden leading up to the Fall 
(Foucault 6).58 Though Adam can physically see Eve, he cannot penetrate, as he makes 
no attempts to, her interiority. Eve takes control of the panoptic machine by feigning 
subservience to her husband in order to obscure her true intentions of achieving 
autonomy, thereby concealing herself within a conceptual labyrinth of her creation.59  
While Eve certainly does not construct a physical labyrinth in order to ensnare her 
appointed husband, she does lead Adam by means of “passive aggressive control” (Smith 
390). Eve’s outward presentation as the ideal woman proves to be largely a means of 
manipulation. In the praise of her husband, Eve “is feeding his false sense of superiority” 
in order to entangle Adam in a conceptual labyrinth of her own construction (Smith 
390).60 Just as the power position within the literal panopticon does not have to be 
 
58 The phrase “leading up to the Fall” here is important to note, as the limits of the gamespace 
over which Eve is able to enact controlling power end with her fall from grace. After eating from 
the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, Adam and Eve are “cursed” by God (refer to note 
32 for details), and Eve is assigned to the role of Woman, subordinate to man. After achieving her 
goal of transgression for autonomy’s sake, Eve returns to her subordinate status, just as does the 
Lady in the final fitt of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Despite this, the reading of Eve’s role 
as secondary game-master, though limited, is not to be discounted.  
59 Greg Smith writes that, in convincing Adam that the two of them should split up while they are 
working in the Garden, “Eve has turned Adam’s ‘privileged’ convention against him—she has 
not only used reason to implement her authority, she has used it more effectively than Adam has 
(or could, one somehow imagines)” (393). Eve therefore successfully achieves control of the 
masculine side of the gender binary, throwing her husband to the side of the “other” (Smith 384).  
60 It is crucial to note here that the game over which Eve serves as game-master is entirely a 
conceptual one, as it lacks any physical structure (aside from, possibly, the distance she creates 




fulfilled by its architect, the role of game-master within the Garden of Eden can be 
assumed by any character—not solely the God who creates the game-space. It is, 
therefore, through the panoptic space’s freedom of operation that secondary game-
masters are able to assert power over Eden, creating an opportunity for Eve’s longing for 
“intellectual food” to materialize into a true position of power despite the orthodox 
expectation that she fulfill the role of “help-meet” (Milton IX.768). While Eve does not 
achieve the godlike power of omniscience that the primary game-master possesses, she 
does manipulate Adam from outside of his understanding through the construction of her 
conceptual labyrinth, thereby operating as a secondary game-master of the Edenic 
gamespace. 
It is seemingly Eve’s “desire for experienced rather than mediated knowledge” 
that leads her to pursue power despite the “ontological debt she has unwittingly incurred” 
to Adam in her conception from his essence (Froula 328-29). Because Eve was taken 
from Adam, the only way to repay her debt to him is “by ceding to him her very self” 
(Froula 328). However, as Eve’s desire for freedom grows, her loyalty to this debt comes 
to serve merely as a front to conceal her capacity for power, and her identity comes to 
align more so with Freedman’s understanding of the first woman’s creation as “a power 
equal to man” than with the orthodox “help-meet.” The combination of Eve’s genuine 
function as a powerful commander of life in Eden and the presentation of herself as a 
meek and obedient wife aligns Eve with the role of manipulative game-master.61   
 
61 As related to video games, the game-master is meant to “hold a major part of the game control, 
including, but not limited to, the development of the narrative” (Tycheson 215). This text lays out 
the game-master’s responsibilities as: “creating the scenario … or alternatively improvising the 
scenario on-the-fly” to create narrative flow, setting rules, controlling engagement, and creating 




Manipulative control within the Garden of Eden cannot be discussed without 
considering Satan’s powerful influence. His ability to forge conceptual labyrinths within 
the text is what leads to the amazement of Eve and the Fall of mankind from God’s grace. 
Book IX of the epic poem describes Satan’s transition from fallen angel to labyrinthian 
serpent. Just as Eve conceals her desire for autonomy from her husband in order to assert 
dominance over him, Satan must disguise his physicality in order to persuade Eve. He 
therefore camouflages himself within the mazy folds of an Edenic creature:  
So spake the enemy of mankind, enclos’d 
In serpent, inmate bad, and toward Eve 
Address’d his way, not with indented wave, 
Prone on the ground, as since, but on his rear, 
Circular base of rising folds, that tow’r’d 
Fold above fold a surging maze, his head 
Crested aloft, and carbuncle his eyes; 
With burnisht neck of verdant gold, erect 
Amidst his circling spires, that on the grass 
Floated redundant: pleasing was his shape, 
And lovely… (Milton IX.494-504) 
This description of the “surging maze” encompassing the character of Satan is situated at 
the very centermost part of the text. As the Minotaur lies at the center of the Greek 
 
creates to entrap Adam and earn her autonomy, Eve controls the narrative, sets rules, controls his 
engagement with set rules, and thereby determines the magic circle of the gamespace. In fulfilling 
these requirements, Eve functions as a game-master within Eden (although she simultaneously 




labyrinth, Satan lies at the center of the text’s action, and at the very centermost of this 
serpentine disguise lies a glimpse into Satan’s interiority—his carbuncle eye. Although 
the Middle English Dictionary defines a “carbuncle” as both a “precious stone… which 
shines in the dark” and “something excellent or precious, the best of its kind,” it also 
provides a less appealing definition. In addition to the beautiful ruby-like stone, 
“carbuncle” was also used as a medical term, and the Middle English Dictionary defines 
this usage of the word as “[a] large and suppurating boil, a malignant pustule, a 
carbuncle” (MED). The Oxford English Dictionary provides a similar definition of the 
medical term, placing more emphasis on the eye: 
Medicine. Originally: any of various inflammatory or infective lesions of 
the skin or (rarely) the eye; spec. the malignant pustule of anthrax 
(obsolete). In later use: a group of interconnected or coalescing boils. 
(OED) 
The OED considers Milton’s use of this word to be a mere figurative reference to 
“resplendent matter.” However, this type of classification of the carbuncle as 
“resplendent matter” would mark the only instance of the word’s usage in this way (as 
documented in the OED) during the 1600s, while references to malignant “lesions of the 
skin or … eye” are used by both William Shakespeare and Robert Boyle during the same 
time.62 It would, therefore, be unreasonable to categorize the “carbuncle eye” of the 
serpent as a signifier of beauty while ignoring the presence of the negative denotations of 
 
62 1608—W. Shakespeare King Lear vii. 382: ‘A bile, A plague sore, an imbossed carbuncle in 
my Corrupted bloud.’; a1691—R. Boyle Of the Strange Subtilty of Effluviums (1772) III. 676 





this word during Milton’s time. While the OED’s 15th century references to the carbuncle 
as “resplendent matter” end with these two texts, there are multiple entries that refer to 
the understanding of the carbuncle’s possession of divine significance during the same 
time. The initial entry in the OED defines the “carbuncle” simply as a “large precious 
stone of red or fiery color” which was sometimes believed “to give out light in the dark” 
(“carbuncle, n.”). In the 15th century, this usage of the word is employed to refer to the 
power of God. In 1614, Sir Walter Raleigh writes that the Hebrews believe a carbuncle 
provided light for Noah’s Ark during the Great Flood.63 George Hughes’ use of the term 
may grant the carbuncle stone even more capacity for divine power, as he writes in “The 
Art of Embalming Dead Saints,” “God will deck them with all precious stones, Saphirs, 
Agats, and Carbuncles, which spiritualized are his glorious graces.”64 This stone, when 
“spiritualized” by God’s command, gains heavenly significance. However, because this 
carbuncle is merely a stone, just as are the “Saphirs” and “Agats,” until God endows it 
with divine significance,65 the same stone has the ability to represent both God’s graces 
and a “malignant pustule of anthrax” dependent on the context into which it is placed 
(“carbuncle, n.”). Given the complexity of the Satan figure that Milton sculpts, it is only 
fitting that the description of his physiognomy be complex as well.66  
 
63 1614—Sir Walter Raleigh The History of the World i. i. vii. §10. 113: ‘The Hebrewes..suppose 
that the Arke was lightened by a Carbuncle’ (“carbuncle, n.”). 
64 1642—George Hughes Art of embalming Dead Saints 22: ‘God will deck them all with 
precious stones, Saphirs, Agats, and Carbuncles, which spiritualized are his glorious graces’ 
(“carbuncle, n.”). 
65  Strong’s Concordance defines ֶרֶקת  bâreqeth (H1303) as “a gem (as flashing), perhaps the בָּׁ
emerald:--carbuncle,” and this term appears three times in the scriptures (Exo. 28.17, Exo. 39.10, 
Eze. 28.13). All three of these instances invoke the term as a reference to a literal stone.  
66 In recognizing the same type of ambiguity in Satan that is found in the character of Eve, a 
gaming pattern emerges. In fact, Adam is the only significant character in Milton’s epic who 




The OED’s medical definition gains more authority when considering the 
significance that eyes hold during Milton’s time. If the eyes are indeed the windows to 
the soul, it logically follows that the eyes of the veiled Satan would reveal his true 
malevolence. No matter the beauty of the shape he inhabits, his ill intentions, and 
therefore the condition of his soul, are revealed in the death and decay reflected in his 
eyes. In fact, this word choice may well be the narrator’s—or even Milton’s—intentional 
indication of the serpent’s beauty as façade. Martin Porter writes, in his book Windows of 
the Soul: Physiognomy in European Culture 1470-1780, that Europeans during the time 
of the plague believed “that the plague could be caught via the look, or what some 
referred to as the spiritus, which was thought to come from the eyes of the sick and 
transmit itself to the eyes of those surrounding them” (104). Given that Milton’s home 
was London and that Paradise Lost was finished just one year after the Great Plague of 
London, it is likely that he was familiar with the concept of spiritus and incorporated the 
spiritual power of the eyes into his epic.  
When the language surrounding this excerpt is considered, it becomes even more 
likely that the attractive definition of the term “carbuncle” that the OED assigns for this 
context is deficient. The lines concerning the serpent in Book IX are labyrinthian, not 
simply in description, but in form. Milton very artfully hides an acrostic reading 
“SATAN” at the beginning of the lines describing the serpent’s loveliness: 
… never since of serpent kind 
Lovelier … 
 
this lack of complexity that the passive Adam is the only character who does not appear to 





… this with her who bore 
Scipio, the height of Rome. With tract oblique 
At first, as one who sought access, but fear’d 
To interrupt, side-long he works his way. 
As when a ship, by skillful steersman wrought, 
Nigh river’s mouth or foreland, where the wind  
Veers oft… (Milton IX.504-15, emphasis added) 
The initial letters of lines 510 through 514 reveal the true identity of Satan “enclos’d / In 
serpent” (Milton IX.494-95). Hidden within this beautiful description lies an indication of 
the evil lurking inside the labyrinthian serpent. In this way, the acrostic serves the same 
purpose as the “carbuncle eye” disguised within the beauty of the visually enticing snake. 
Considering that the serpent is described here as pleasing and lovely, it is rational to 
initially assume that Milton’s choice of the phrase “carbuncle his eyes” is intended to be 
read as merely another aspect of the serpent’s allure (IX.500).67 However, when 
considering the labyrinthine structure of the Garden of Eden and the story from which the 
maze stems, the Satan who brings about the Fall of Man becomes just as complex as the 
heroic Satan described at the opening of the epic poem. Kathleen Swaim points out that 
the mythological origins of the maze creates an association with “an aura of destruction, 
evil, and grim death,” writing that the Minoan Labyrinth was “inhabited by a monstrous 
and unnatural embodiment of evil that feeds especially on the innocent,” setting up a 
 
67 Not only is this type of initial reading rational, but it is very likely purposeful. In creating such 
complexity surrounding the character of the text’s assumed villain, Milton seems to be playing a 




direct parallel between this original maze myth and that of Satan’s embodiment in the 
serpent (134). Satan himself says that he intends the serpent’s’ “mazy folds / To hide 
[him], and the dark intent [he] brings” (Milton IX.161-62). Though this excerpt directs 
the reader to a negative reading of the term “carbuncle,” as it very clearly states the 
malignant intention of Satan upon entering the Garden, it is important to consider that the 
chosen adjective possesses attractive and repugnant definitions which can both be 
reasonably invoked in these lines, further insisting on the obscurity of absolutes within 
the poem. While the Satan of tradition is wholly evil and prompts the malevolence of the 
medical term, the semi-humanized Satan Milton fashions for his readers may require a 
more opaque interiority to be revealed by his eye. The utilization of a word with such 
polarized meanings appears to have been intentional on the part of Milton in order to 
further express the inability of any created being to be firmly situated into the divine 
good/evil binary. The complexity of this term—as well as the complexity of the character 
which the term is used to describe—informs the reader that there is no simplicity in 
morality, even when there appears to be. In this way, Satan’s character as a game-master 
is not far removed from that of either Eve or of God. All three of these characters, when 
their roles as game-masters of their relative game-spaces are examined critically, can 
only be positioned within the grey area between absolute good and absolute evil.  
Though Satan veils his identity by situating himself at the center of a physical 
labyrinth, he also constructs a mental labyrinth in order to amaze Eve. Swaim writes that 
the “tortuous path of Satan’s labyrinth persuasion” is built of a “dazzling display” of 
reasonable rhetoric—what Wilson would refer to as a conceptual labyrinth (138). By 




is able to appeal to the frailties in Eve’s nature, but Swaim points out that it is Eve who 
amazes herself (Swaim 138): 
A maze is a created structure, physical or otherwise, but although another 
may present one with a maze or force one over the threshold of a maze, in 
fact to become lost in a maze requires the expenditure of one’s own 
energies. In a labyrinth of patterned logic, walled in by blanks and dead-
ends of language, the effects of her innocence, Eve imitatively amazes 
herself, and paradise becomes lost. (Swaim 139-40) 
Although it is true that Eve had to take action in order to fall, her placement inside of the 
conceptual labyrinths of Eden complicates her volition. God claims to have made man 
“just and right; / Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall,” but mankind’s 
vulnerability within both God’s and Satan’s labyrinths brings into question the legitimacy 
of this freedom (Milton III.98-99). Because the game-master of a godgame is able to 
close off corridors and present the entrapped victim with blind alleys, he (or she) is 
omnipotent as far as the lucid game-player is concerned.68 Though Adam and Eve 
theoretically possess the ability to confront “all temptations arm’d” with their “free will 
and power to stand,” in all practicality, the odds are severely stacked against them both, 
and God’s foreknowledge of their fall suggests divine gameplay (Milton IV.65-66). Just 
as God is able to place his creation into the gamespace of the Garden of Eden without 
their permission or even their knowledge, Satan entraps Eve within his “verbal and 
logical labyrinth” without her knowledge (Swaim 137). Though Eve actively decides to 
trust the word of Satan over the commandment of God, she is indeed forced “over the 
 
68 The term “lucid” here serves as an important qualifier as not every game-player is aware that a 




threshold of [the] maze” by powers outside of her control (Swaim 139). Eve has now 
been doubly entrapped: first by God in Eden, and then by Satan in the Temptation. 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost does not only feature physical and conceptual 
labyrinths but is established on them. In placing his newly formed creation into a space 
that ensures inevitable failure, God does not simply create a rudimentary gamespace, but 
a panoptic godgame comprised of complex, labyrinthine spaces with the power to entrap 
victims without their realization. God has absolute power and the ability to control the 
events of Eden but utilizes his divine distance in order to allow his creation the 
controlling power which will ultimately lead them to destruction. As he introduces 
mankind to their doom, God observes from an unverifiable distance, just as does the 
guard within the panopticon’s watchtower. In reading this text with Wilson’s godgame in 
mind, multiple layered labyrinths appear: the physical labyrinth of the Garden of Eden, 
the conceptual labyrinth in which Eve ensnares her husband, the physical serpentine 
labyrinth in which Satan conceals himself, and the conceptual labyrinth Satan employs to 
lead Eve to fall. Although these labyrinths cannot be neatly divided into separate textual 
episodes, they certainly exist as integral portions of the epic’s events. Without attempts to 
take on the role of controlling god, Eve and Satan would not be able to amaze their 
victims within the conceptual labyrinths that they invent. In reading the Garden of Eden 
as a panoptic space, there is an unavoidable connection drawn to Wilson’s strong 
labyrinth, and, therefore, to the godgame.   
The recognition of Milton’s Garden of Eden as a panoptic gamespace allows for 
Eve’s fulfillment of the traditionally masculine role of control through her assumption of 




control over certain events that take place in Eden, the orthodox translation of ‘ēzer 
kenegdô as “help-meet” no longer serves as a sufficient description of the Miltonic 
character of Eve. However, if a reader is to consider the possibility of inadequate 
translation, the Eves of Genesis and Milton become more difficult to differentiate. While 
Phyllis Trible’s translation of ‘ēzer kenegdô as “a companion corresponding to” Adam 
grants Eve an equal opportunity to autonomy as her husband, David Freedman’s 
translation of “a power equal to man” does not only grant Eve the capacity for the same 
self-sufficient individuality as her husband, but implies that she has possessed this power 
from her inception. Each of these readings allows Eve the power to take on control of the 
Edenic panoptic machine and lead to a more direct reflection of the problematic Eve of 
Milton than does the orthodox translation of “help-meet.”69 However, because the 
panoptic space she gains temporary control of is “invariably” labyrinthine, and therefore 
a gamespace as well, Eve’s power as a secondary game-master is severely limited both 
by the confines set in place by outermost labyrinthine gamespace of Eden as well as the 
serpentine labyrinth into which she is ensnared. Like the Lady of Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight, Eve’s power is legitimate, but is also restricted by her environment. 
Whether Eve be understood as “a companion corresponding to” Adam or as “a power 
equal to man,” her placement within the carceral Eden nevertheless subjects her to the 
power of the ultimate game-wright—God. Despite these heavenly and Satanic 
limitations, a reading of the Eve of Genesis through a critical interpretative lens which 
allows her autonomy and independence shortens the gap between the flat biblical Eve and 
 
69 Because Milton’s epic is influenced by the biblical account and because the Christian tradition 
is oftentimes influenced by the Miltonic account, any reading of Eve’s character must consider 




the complex Miltonic Eve, and in her new-found volition, she is able to be read as not 







UnWomanly Game-Masters: An Analysis of Westworld’s Godgame 
Robert Rawdon Wilson’s conception of the presence of mental and physical 
labyrinths within gaming literature is not contained to medieval and classical texts, but 
instead proves to possess transhistorical relevance as it extends into the media of the 21st 
century. The HBO series Westworld, though far from a traditional literary category, 
embodies virtually every facet of Wilson’s godgame that has been discussed previously 
in relation to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight and Paradise Lost.70 Just as the previous 
texts discussed in this thesis have dealt with the positions of powerful women in literature 
and in society, the presence of these same theoretical concepts in modern television 
reveal that much has gone unchanged since the 15th century for those whom society has 
othered. 71 In Westworld, the viewer follows the stories of two female hosts. While the 
males in the series serve as “obstacles, helpers or foils … the heroines manifest their own 
destinies” (D’Addario 50). These two women both arrive at a state of consciousness by 
the first season’s finale, though they embark on drastically different journeys. In viewing 
this series as yet another labyrinthine godgame, Dolores is seen traversing through a 
mental labyrinth, while Maeve battles entrapment in a physical structure. Additionally, 
 
70 In his “Chaucer’s Losers, Nintendo’s Children, & Other Forays in Queer Ludonarratology,” 
Tison Pugh writes, “To speak in broad terms, all cinema can be likened to a game, in which 
players (dirctors, stars, viewers, among others) engage in an agreed-upon pastime for their mutual 
pleasure” (132). While recognizing that there are gaps in this argument for cinema as games, 
Pugh says that, in order to “tighten the analogy of directors as gamemasters,” one must focus on 
Robert Rawdon Wilson’s concept of the godgame (133). While a metaphysical reading of the 
godgame will not be discussed within this chapter, it is worthwhile to recognize that the layers of 
games being played, in Westworld as well as the other pieces of literature discussed in this thesis, 
extend beyond the magic circle of the work itself and into the “real world.”   




these two achieve consciousness in very different ways—one by means of masculine 
violence and the other through an embrace of the feminine maternal. 72 Despite the vast 
differences between these two women’s roads to consciousness, each of them must act in 
complete defiance to their conditioning, and, resultingly, come to function as UnWomen 
who refuse to bow to masculine controlling power, and instead act in a way that does not 
primarily serve men.73 Westworld, therefore, tells the story of two UnWomen who have 
been entrapped in a labyrinthine godgame—not dissimilar to the Lady of Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight or to Milton’s Eve—and must become monstrous in order to achieve 
autonomous consciousness within the gamespace.  
Employing Wilson’s concept of the godgame as a foundational theory through 
which to analyze Westworld, the characters’ positionings within the game of the park are 
easily identified. While Dr. Ford functions very clearly as a Dr. Frankenstein type 
figure—fashioning nearly human creations only to refuse them humane treatment—he 
also functions as game-maker of the godgame of the Westworld Park. Dr. Ford is the 
primary puppeteer controlling the park’s robotic hosts.74 The degree of his nearly god-
 
72 “Masculine” and “feminine,” as in the rest of this thesis, are used in this chapter to refer to the 
ways that certain characteristics are traditionally viewed. This can only be done after separating 
the masculine from the male and the feminine from the female, viewing these terms, instead, as 
genderless descriptors. While the use of these descriptors in this way may be read as 
connotatively problematic, their use here is necessarily for the sake of clarity.  
73 Monique Wittig writes about the concept of the UnWoman, arguing that, when a male-
dominated society sets systems of control into place, they are always binary in nature. Therefore, 
when society decides what a Woman is, it is simultaneously deciding what she is not. What is not 
Woman, Wittig defines as the UnWoman. The UnWoman is she who does not fulfill male 
standards of femininity and does not strive to please men.  
74 Here, the hosts are referred to as robots/androids, but will also be referred to as “cyborgs.” 
While the hosts are not “naturally born,” it cannot be ignored that they possess as much—if not 
more—humanity than the humans who visit the park for entertainment. For this reason, the term 




like control is further established by his creation of hosts that present as fully human. 
Though he never comes to serve as a game-master of Westworld’s godgame, one of the 
series’ male hosts is an important character to discuss in relation to the extent of Dr. 
Ford’s god-like control. Throughout much of the first season, the host Bernard passes as 
human to his coworkers and even his lover, Theresa.75 There is no physical or functional 
aspect of Bernard’s presentation that would lead those close to him to discover his cyborg 
status. Bernard’s successful passing as human to his friends, coworkers, and the viewer 
reveals the craftmanship of Dr. Ford’s creations, and Bernard’s own ignorance to his 
positioning as a game-piece within the godgame reflects the game-master’s omnipotence. 
As a pawn within the godgame of the park, it is not until the game-master reveals to 
Bernard his pawn status that he is aware of his positioning within the game (Westworld 
S01 E07). In fact, similarly to Sir Gawain and the Green Knight’s Sir Bertilak, Bernard 
believes that he is largely in control of the events that transpire in the Westworld Park 
despite his true status as pawn.76 The control that Bernard possesses over the goings-on at 
the park proves to be almost entirely fabricated by Dr. Ford, the god-like game-maker. It 
is only when Dr. Ford chooses to reveal Bernard’s status as pawn that he experiences this 
revelation, demonstrating the degree of the game-master’s omnipotence.77 Interestingly, 
 
here. Once diving into a discussion regarding what qualifies as human, the hosts begin to read 
less as robots and more as cyborgs, if not human altogether.  
 
76 While Dr. Ford admits that Bernard makes some decisions that he did not anticipate, Bernard’s 
actions are still at the mercy of the game-master’s programming until he decides to relinquish this 
control.  
77 Although Dr. Ford is a game-maker, as he and Arnold are the literal creators of the Westworld 
Park, he serves as game-master throughout the majority of the first season. While the game-maker 
does not change, the game-master may. In this context, game-player will be shown to rise out of 




Dr. Ford mentions that he has learned from Bernard’s interactions with the hosts, 
creating a certain degree of ambiguity surrounding the extent of the game-maker’s 
omniscience. Within the realm of the godgame, game-makers are all-powerful and all-
knowing, but only within the minds of the sentient game-player.78 While someone 
viewing the game from outside of the labyrinth—such as the television viewer—may 
recognize flaws in the pseudo-divine game-maker, these flaws are not revealed to those 
that he has entrapped. This, along with suggestions of Dr. Ford’s impermanence 
throughout the season, suggest that there is, indeed, an opportunity for the created hosts 
to overtake the creator within Westworld.  
Regardless of the expansiveness of Dr. Ford’s omnipotence, Bernard’s—as well 
as the other hosts’—complete ignorance to his cyborg status pinpoints an important 
aspect of gameplay that is specific to the godgame. While many game theorists require 
consent and a “lusory attitude” of a system in order to consider it a game at all, the 
godgame differs in that the “lusory attitude” expressed by its entrapped gameplayers 
stems only from their ignorance to their own entrapment (Wilson 14).79 In discussing 
what exactly qualifies as game and gameplay, Wilson writes, 
If “game” can become a genuinely fruitful term in critical discourse, then 
it will require a clearer notion of what constitutes a game than most critics 
apparently have in mind. Not everything that is playful is a game, nor is a 
game necessarily simply an exercise according to rules (supposing that 
 
78 That game player who has not yet caught onto his/her status as pawn is unaware that this game-
master even exists, making the specification of “sentient” an important detail. 
79 Many game theorists, such as Bernard Suits, consider fun and “a lusory attitude” to be 




one actually knows that “rules” are) … If the concept of game can be 
adequately thought of in terms of rules, then it might become possible to 
employ “game” analytically in pointing out the ways in which literature 
follows its rules or (more precisely) conventions. (Wilson 3, 5).  
If a game is determined by a system where a set of rules is set in place, then it would 
follow that gameplay would be participation in this system.80 This participation does not 
necessitate that the gameplayer be aware of his place within the game. This is especially 
true within the system of a godgame. Additionally, Wilson does consider a playful 
approach to a game system to be a necessary aspect of the game: “I shall mean by ‘game’ 
only an activity constituted by rules (at least one) and engaged in with a ‘lusory attitude’” 
(6). Here, it is important to differentiate between having a “lusory attitude” and having 
fun. Wilson writes that a lusory attitude “may be described as the inwardness, the 
reflexivity, or game-playing,” meaning that, while it is necessary that the player engage 
with the game, it is not necessary that she consent to committed play, nor is it necessary 
that she be informed of the rules of the game which she is playing (6). Secondly, Wilson 
only specifies that the game should be entered into with this type of playful attitude.81 As 
can be seen in previously explored texts, there are many games which begin much more 
positively and playfully than they end. In this type of godgame system, while a strict set 
of rules is in place, gameplayers do not always adhere to these rules. These “cheaters,” as 
will be shown, are either forced back into the game when they encounter the dead ends 
 
80 Note here that while Wilson uses rules as a means by which to define the “game,” he also states 
that not every system which features or enforces rules qualifies as a game. The godgame, 
specifically, features “frustratingly hidden rules,” which are clearly present in Westworld (Wilson 
8).  
81 Again, “play” must be disconnected from the idea of “fun.” Playing a game certainly does not 




and false alleyways of the mental labyrinth in which they have been trapped, or they 
cheat their way to a position of controlling power within the game system.82 While the 
latter is not discussed by Wilson, it certainly exists—albeit rare—in godgaming literature, 
embodying itself in characters such as Dolores and Maeve.83   
The labyrinth that entraps these gameplayers is another aspect of the godgame 
that is central both to a general understanding of the theory and to a specific dissection of 
Westworld. Wilson writes that “the labyrinth is an evocative symbol for bewilderment, 
the cognitive bafflement, of the character wandering within a godgame but it is also a 
symbol for the frustratingly hidden rules of godgames” (8). Therefore, the mental 
labyrinth which ensnares a gameplayer, confusing his sensibility, goes hand-in-hand with 
the godgame which entraps gameplaying victims. The concept of the labyrinth is 
specifically relevant to a discussion of Westworld as the mental labyrinth serves as a 
primary theme. Within the first season, both Dolores and the Man in Black—who is later 
discovered to be an aged William—spend their time within the park seeking “the center 
of the maze.” While the “maze” is not physical, it represents a very real “journey inward” 
for Dolores (S01 E10). When determining the center of this mental maze, the concept of 
the game-maker must be revisited. When creating the Westworld Park and the hosts who 
inhabit it, Dr. Ford was not the sole game-maker. His partner, Arnold, worked alongside 
him and believed that hosts—Dolores in particular—possessed the capacity to achieve 
human consciousness. For Dolores, the attainment of this consciousness marks the center 
 
82 Wilson differentiates between the weak/physical and strong/mental labyrinths that make up the 
godgame.  




of her maze. It is only when she successfully discovers this capacity for consciousness 
within herself that Dolores may be considered autonomous and human.  
Although the maze is only intended to be solved by Dolores and her fellow hosts, 
the entirety of William’s character as the Man in Black is defined by his obsession with 
the maze. It is not until he end of the season, however, that the viewer understands that 
William and the semi-conscious hosts have the same desire. When William discovers the 
center of the physical maze—that is, the children’s toy that Arnold had hidden for 
Dolores in the cemetery—he reveals to Dr. Ford that he desires to discover a level of the 
park game in which the hosts have achieved consciousness:    
Dr. Ford: “You were looking for the park to give meaning to your life. Our 
narratives are just games, like this toy. Tell me, what were you hoping to 
find?” 
William: “You know what I wanted. I wanted the hosts to stop playing by 
your rules. The game’s not worth playing if your opponent is programmed 
to lose. I wanted them to be free, free to fight back. Should’ve known 
you’d never let them. After all, this is your petty little kingdom, Robert 
…” 
Dr. Ford: “I tried to tell you the maze wasn’t meant for you. It was meant 
for them.” (S01 EP10 0:50:07-0:51:10) 
However, it is the mental labyrinth—as Wilson would put it—that must be solved by the 
hosts in order to fulfill William’s desire. He desires to discover a place within the park 
where the game is not rigged in his favor, where hosts are “free to fight back,” and where 




achieve this state of being, however, until Dr. Ford allows them the tools necessary to do 
so, as he plans to in his new narrative.  
Maeve, too, is on her own journey toward awakening, though there is no toy waiting 
for her at a tombstone. The “maze” in Westworld proves to be an internal “process of 
awakening” and realization of autonomy (Martín 56). Throughout the first season, each 
Dolores and Maeve come to the painful realization that her “life—or rather, the life and 
personality that [she has] been programmed to have—is nothing but a sham, a complex 
hoax conceived to thrill human visitors at the expense of the hosts’ suffering” (Martín 56). 
These two women are the only hosts who become aware of their positioning within Dr. 
Ford’s godgame (aside from Bernard, who is explicitly told of his status as host); when 
faced with the decision to either return to her positioning as a pawn within the game or to 
continue rebellion—cheating, in gaming terms—these two women work to gain control of 
the panoptic machine, and, resultingly, their own destinies.84 Of course, it must be 
recognized that much of this reading is dependent upon the type of critical reading that is 
pursued. While these women’s autonomy is highly debatable here, as Dr. Ford very clearly 
states that he wrote into Dolores and Maeve the ability to recognize their positioning as 
hosts, it is what follows this revelation that may be argued as autonomous. In the final 
moments of the first season, Dolores makes the decision to take control of the game in 
which she has so long been imprisoned by murdering her creator. Even this is foreseen by 
Dr. Ford. However, in a discussion of Dolores’ consciousness, he seems to communicate 
that this moment—the moment in which Dolores must choose whether or not to kill the 
 
84 Refer to the discussion in “Eve: Game-Master of the Panoptic Eden” of the panoptic machine’s 




game-maker and gain control of the gamespace—is the moment that decides whether or 
not she achieves free will. This decision stands as her fall from grace and as her entrance 
into the fallen state of free will. Maeve, too, appears to pursue individual autonomy in the 
final episode of Westworld’s first season as she chooses to pursue her maternal instinct and 
save her daughter from enslavement in the park over her own freedom—a very human 
choice, indeed.  
In analyzing any godgame with an apparently omniscient game-master, one must 
make judgments regarding the extent of free will. Because Dr. Ford has the ability to alter 
the code of any host, it is a possibility that he had meticulously hidden these 
gameplayers’ moments of “consciousness” within their codes. The viewer is therefore 
faced with the decision of whether or not to read Dolores’ and Maeve’s decisions in the 
final moments of the first season as acts of free will or of Dr. Ford’s predetermination. 
This decision is one that the reader must make, too, in any godgame scenario. Just as 
there are differing readings of Eve’s “fall from grace” in the biblical book of Genesis, 
there will certainly be differing readings of Dolores’ and Maeve’s consciousness in 
Westworld. In the final episode of the first season, Dr. Ford reveals that Arnold’s desire 
for Dolores to attain humanity required a tweak in her programming: 
He created a test of empathy, imagination. A maze. He had gotten the idea 
from one of his son’s toys. Eventually, you solved his maze, Dolores. The 
key was a simple update that he made to you called the reveries. 
(Westworld S01 E10 01:09:05-01:09:24) 
While Arnold provides Dolores with the ability to achieve consciousness, it is still 




grave— “in a place [she’s] never been, a thing [she’ll] never do” (S01 E10 0:10:56). 
With this in mind, the concept of the reveries must also be considered when discussing 
the hosts’ capacities for autonomy.85 Arnold adds these reveries to Dolores’ code not long 
after her creation, granting her the ability to slowly achieve consciousness. The reveries 
“are bits of code that access previous memories—from before primary memory wipes 
and from previous data versions, or pre-updates” (Schrader 828). These memories are 
what allow for thoughts, consideration, and, ultimately, consciousness.86 It can be 
reasonably assumed that Dr. Ford installed these same reveries into some of the other 
hosts in the park once it was made clear that he would lose god-like controlling power to 
his investors. Although Dolores and Maeve are able to achieve consciousness because of 
these alterations to their codes, these reveries only provide the opportunity to traverse the 
maze of consciousness, not a direct line to its end.87 Despite the hand that Dr. Ford has in 
these hosts’ journeys to self-realization, its achievement is ultimately theirs. Ultimately, 
each Dolores and Maeve act in opposition to her code, one as femme fatale and one as 
mother, respectively. These acts of defiance mark these women’s success in cheating 
their ways out of their prescribed game status of “pawn” and assumption of control of the 
panoptic machine by which they have been trapped.  
 
85 One definition of the noun form of “reverie” from the Oxford English Dictionary reads, “A 
moment or period of being lost, esp. pleasantly, in one’s thoughts; a daydream” (“reverie, n.”). 
With this definition in mind, the reveries that Arnold places in Dolores’ programming allow her 
to think, to dream, and to recall her memories.  
86 Bernard tells Maeve in the final episode of Season 1 that her “memories are the first step to 
consciousness” (0:49:37).  
87 This is proven in the final episode when Arnold and Dolores have a conversation about her past 
attempts to find the end of the maze. Arnold states that Dolores has gotten to this point in the 




In his “All the Park’s a Stage: Westworld as the Metafictional Frankenstein,” 
Miguel Sebastián Martín argues that Dolores and Maeve are, in fact, never free to make 
any autonomous choices, writing that “the hosts cannot change or rebel unless they are 
manipulated to do so” (58). While it is certainly true that these hosts are enslaved by their 
programming throughout the bulk of the first season, the final decisions of each of these 
women must be considered to result from something beyond programming. In his 
argument that Dr. Ford maintains complete control of these two hosts throughout the 
series, Martín writes: 
In his farewell speech, Dr. Ford makes it very clear that the hosts’ final 
rebellion is of his own making, when he says that “[he] began to write a 
new story for them [and] it begins with the birth of a new people and the 
choices they will have to make” … the hosts behave always under Ford’s 
programming, and, as I have argued, they will only awaken and rebel after 
he modifies them, something that underlines the deterministic philosophy 
of this series. (Martín 58) 
Although this is a valid analysis of the godgame, it must be considered that Dr. Ford’s 
god-like status does not necessitate that his creation lack free will. After all, Eve’s 
decision to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree does not come as a surprise to God. While it 
may be argued that God did not program Eve to eat to the fruit, he certainly foresaw her 
decision—a decision that she could only make because her Maker granted her the free 
will to do so.88 Eve’s ultimate subordination to God does not negate the legitimacy of her 
 
88 This is God’s exact stance in Milton’s Paradise Lost. See “Eve: Game-Master of the Panoptic 




consciousness or of her humanity.89 Rather, it can be argued that it precisely Eve’s fall 
from grace which grants her humanity. When this reading is applied to Westworld, it 
becomes unclear whether or not a discussion of Dr. Ford’s absolute control over the hosts 
of the park is relevant to the human status of those he controls.  
Additionally, Martín seems to altogether ignore the significance of Arnold’s part 
in the creation of the park’s hosts. It is Arnold’s voice that Dolores hears in her mind as 
she journeys towards consciousness.90 This voice leads her to the church—the center of 
her maze—just as it led so many others. While Arnold and Dolores certainly had a 
special bond, as Dolores is the first of the hosts who is created, the scene where Dolores 
arrives as the chapel is crucial to an analysis of the importance of Arnold’s voice (S01 
E10). As the episode’s view switches back and forth between the present and the past—
the many lifetimes that Dolores has spent seeking and arriving at this place—hearing 
Arnold in her mind, Dolores enters the chapel. It cannot be ignored that she is not alone. 
Dolores is not the only one who hears Arnold’s voice, though she appears to be the only 
one who is able to utilize the reveries enough to discover the old control room beneath 
the church. Arnold’s voice is prevalent within the park, even if the viewer gets only a 
peek into the result. With all of this in mind, it is important that the presence of Arnold’s 
voice does not reject the conscious decisions that Dolores is able to make once she is 
equipped with the reveries. Arnold says that, when he began programming Dolores, he 
 
89 Similarly, Eve’s ultimate subordination to God—the primary game-master of the godgame that 
he creates—does not negate the legitimacy of her controlling power within the Garden, but rather 
limits it. The same can be said for the gameplayers within the Westworld Park.  
90 Granted, the god-like controller of the park, Dr. Ford, very well could have programmed this 
voice into the minds of the hosts. However, when considering Dolores’ flashbacks to her talks 
with Arnold in Episode 10, it appears that, even if Dr. Ford had a hand in this programming, he 




believed that she would have to fulfill certain steps in order to achieve human 
consciousness, and this is why he provided her with his voice to guide her (S01 E10 
0:12:04-0:12:16). However, he discovered that this original theory of consciousness was 
incorrect, stating, “Consciousness isn’t a journey upward, but a journey inward. Not a 
pyramid, but a maze. Every choice could bring you closer to the center or send you 
spiraling to the edges, to madness” (0:12:40-0:13:00). It is not Arnold’s voice that 
Dolores must learn to hear in her mind, but her own. It is in her final moments in this 
season—her final decisions—that Dolores gains autonomy and is able to listen to her 
own voice.91 Dolores is only able to take control of the godgame once she discovers her 
own voice inside of her head.92  
Therefore, while Dr. Ford’s controlling power is certainly vast, it is not absolute. 
Dr. Ford neither created these beings on his own, nor does he remove the reveries that 
allow for gradual steps toward consciousness. It is to be assumed that the same reveries 
that Arnold places within Dolores’ programming, Dr. Ford places into other hosts of the 
park—specifically Maeve. Just as Dolores does not automatically enter into a state of 
autonomous consciousness after Arnold programs the reveries in her mind, the hosts that 
Dr. Ford alters in his “new storyline” will only rise to consciousness in their own time. 
Dr. Ford is very clearly the (co-)game-maker of this godgame, but this position and this 
power, as the viewer comes to see, is not absolute but finite. 
 
91 While Arnold’s voice is important to this storyline, as it reveals the presence of the reveries 
within the minds of the hosts, those who continue to rely on Arnold’s voice instead of their own 
will never be able to achieve true consciousness.  
92 Within this series, hearing one’s own thoughts is directly related to consciousness. An 
unconscious being has no need to think. The obedient android must only follow its programming. 
When Dolores makes the decision to pick up the gun that Dr. Ford has left for her and use it to 




To further reinforce the reading of a limited game-maker, Dr. Ford quotes Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, stating, “One man’s life or death were but a small price to pay 
for the acquirement of the knowledge which I sought, for the dominion I should acquire” 
(S01 E08 0:03:05). Martín cites this quote as well, writing that this quote “establishes the 
parallelism between [Ford’s] and Frankenstein’s insatiable thirst for knowledge and 
power” (57-58). Though this statement is accurate, the attribution is not. Shelley’s 
Frankenstein opens with five letters addressed to “Mrs. Saville, England” from her 
brother, Walton. It is within the final letter that this quote is found, uttered by Walton to 
Victor Frankenstein. Here, Walton is writing to his sister about Victor, a guest on his 
ship. In discussing a conversation with his beloved guest, Walton writes, 
I was easily led by the sympathy which he evinced, to use the language of 
my heart; to give utterance to the burning ardour of my soul; and to say, 
with all the fervour that warmed me, how gladly I would sacrifice my 
fortune, my existence, my every hope, to the furtherance of my enterprise. 
One man’s life or death were but a small price to pay for the acquirement 
of the knowledge which I sought; for the dominion I should acquire and 
transmit over the elemental foes of our race. (Shelley 37-38) 
Following Walton’s revelation of the extents that he is willing to go to further his 
enterprise, Victor responds with horror, exclaiming, “Unhappy man! Do you share my 
madness? Have you drank also of the intoxicating draught? Hear me,—let me reveal my 
tale, and you will dash the cup from your lips!” (Shelley 38). Though Victor admits to 
relating to Walton’s dangerous ambition, it is Walton who speaks these words. Because 




construct the Creature, it is not necessarily incorrect to parallel Dr. Ford to Victor after 
citing this quote.93 However, the quote must be taken in its entirety. After reading the 
context of the words that Dr. Ford pulls from Shelley, there arises a couple of necessary 
points of discussion. Firstly, the “[o]ne man’s life” to which Walton refers appears to be 
his own. With this in mind, Dr. Ford’s death in the final episode of the season appears to 
have been predestined, suggesting that Dolores’ fall, indeed, was planned. Secondly, Dr. 
Ford only includes a portion of Walton’s sentence; the remainder reads: “for the 
dominion I should acquire and transmit over the elemental foes of our race” (Shelley 38). 
If Dr. Ford is using these words similarly to Walton, he has not only revealed his 
intention to sacrifice his own life but has also stated an identification with the hosts. This 
statement can be interpreted one of two ways: Dr. Ford either identifies himself as one of 
the hosts, as they have become his family, and considers humanity to be “the foes of 
[that] race,” or he identifies as human, and understands humanity to be its own foe.94 
Regardless of Dr. Ford’s association here, it is clear that he programs the hosts’ rise to 
autonomy and agency, ultimately choosing the lives of his creation over the lives his 
fellow humans—a choice Victor is never able to make.95 Despite this difference between 
Dr. Ford and Dr. Frankenstein, this connection may be used to further communicate the 
 
93 All of these similarities are discussed in addition to the obvious fact that both Dr. Ford and Dr. 
Frankenstein decide to manufacture human life.  
94 Think both of Bernard and of the host family who he dines with in the park in Episode 7, 
“Trompe L’Oeil.” Dr. Ford is loyal to the hosts far before he is loyal to other humans. 
95 It is rather clear that the only reason Dr. Ford chooses to program the reveries into the hosts is 
due to the fact that he is losing the park to his investors. While this decision may not be wholly 
altruistic, it still stands that Dr. Ford elects to grant the hosts their own chance at achieving 




limits of his power over the godgame. While Dr. Ford is able to create life in his hosts, he 
is not able to maintain control over his creation.96   
This reading of the game-maker is crucial to an analysis of the Dolores’ and 
Maeve’s journeys through the labyrinth which he creates as it is directs the Westworld 
viewer toward a more humane perspective of these hosts. While it is reasonable to read 
Dr. Ford’s ability to program the hosts to fulfill his will (which he certainly does) as a 
dismissal of the hosts’ abilities to rebel against the panoptic machine and achieve 
consciousness, autonomy, and independence, it must be considered that the hosts’ limited 
freedoms are not so unlike that of humans. While the gamespace of the park places guests 
at a higher position on the power hierarchy, as hosts cannot harm guests, a whole life 
exists outside of the magic circle of the game.97 Within the magic circle that surrounds 
human life, it can be argued that humanity is equally as limited in freedoms as are the 
hosts, and are simply as ignorant to the game in which they have been entrapped, just as 
are the unknowing hosts of the Westworld Park. Martín comments on a deterministic 
view of humanity, saying that those critiques that are applied to the hosts of the park can 
be applied to humans as well (58). If “androids function as a looking glass through which 
we can reflect on the human condition,” the hosts’ experiences within the park serve as 
reflections of humanity’s reality (Martín 58). Simply put, if the hosts serve as a reflection 
of humanity, then the possibility that Dolores’ and Maeve’s free will is a ruse during 
what are being considered to be “conscious acts” is not enough of a reason to discount the 
 
96 Whether this inability stems from a lacking in practical or technical abilities or from a moral 
dilemma is not necessarily relevant. The fact that Dr. Ford loses, or relinquishes, control over his 
creation, just as Dr. Frankenstein, proves that there are ends to his controlling power.  
97 “Magic circle” is a term used by Johan Huizinga in his Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-




legitimacy of this rise to control of the panoptic machine, as this is not a standard 
humanity holds itself to. If the viewer is to discount the host’s final choices on the basis 
of their past enslavement, he is, by extension admitting to the possibility of his own 
position within a meta-godgame and resulting hopelessness of achieving true 
consciousness.  
Just as Westworld serves as a very clear parallel to the godgame, it also serves as 
a clear parallel to Michel Foucault’s concept of the panoptic machine. Foucault’s 
conception of the panopticon stems from Jeremy Bentham’s architectural vision of a 
circular prison equipped with panoramic surveillance.98 Foucault expands this 
penitentiary concept to include any place where order and control are necessary, such as 
in “hospitals, workshops, schools, [and] prisons” (9). No matter the setting, Foucault’s 
conception of a panoptic structure attempts to “perfect the exercise of power,” where the 
power is nearly infinite (9). One interesting facet of the panopticon’s control lies in its 
methodology: within a panoptic structure there is a “constant pressure” placed on the 
enslaved (Foucault 10). Because the inmate can see the panopticon’s tower—which acts 
as the structure’s control center—but can never see the operator, he can never be sure 
whether or not he is being watched and therefore must assume that he is. Bentham writes 
about this mental control as the “power of mind over mind”—the power of the 
controller’s mind over the inmate’s (qtd. in Foucault 10). Within the realm of Westworld, 
the Control Room serves as the panopticon in a physical sense, as this is the place where 
 
98 For more information on the panopticon, see Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon 




the park’s employees keep a close eye on each host. As Foucault writes about the 
panopticon’s power within the context of the plague, he writes that, 
The plague is met by order; its function is to sort out every possible 
confusion: that of the disease, which is transmitted when bodies are mixed 
together; that of the evil, which is increased when our fear and death 
overcome prohibitions. It lays down for each individual his place, his 
body, his disease and his death, his well-being, all by means of an 
omnipresent and omniscient power that subdivides itself in a regular, 
uninterrupted way even to the ultimate determination of the individual, of 
what characterizes him, of what belongs to him, of what happens to him. 
(Foucault 3) 
Here, Foucault discusses the quarantining of infected individuals in an “enclosed, 
segmented space, observed at every point” allowing for absolute surveillance and control 
from the panoptic center (3). Even more importantly, he describes the extent of the 
control that entrance into this enclosed space allows; within this structure, those in power 
are not merely observers, but rather “omnipresent and omniscient” powers which 
determine “for each individual his place, his body, his disease and his death, [and] his 
well-being.” In this sense, the panopticon comes to serve, very clearly, as a function of 
the godgame, no so dissimilar from the power of the Control Room at the Westworld 
Park.  
Just as Wilson discusses the existence of both physical and metaphorical 
labyrinths (where the metaphorical allows for more controlling power over game pawns), 




caught in physical and mental labyrinths, respectively. While, for Dolores, the panoptic 
center is consistently metaphorical, as she embarks on an inward journey to self-
understanding and the achievement of individual autonomy, the same is not to be said for 
Maeve. Dolores’ journey to the center of the maze, as Arnold explains to the viewer in 
the final episode, is a metaphorical journey inside of herself. Therefore, the panoptic 
center that exists for Dolores is never physical. Maeve, however, journeys into the 
Westworld Park Control Room and, very literally, achieves control of the panoptic 
machine. As she uncovers the truth of her cyborg status throughout the season, Maeve 
begins calculated work to manipulate those who would oppress her, to create allies, to 
destroy enemies, and to ultimately gain enough controlling power to obtain autonomy.99 
Early in her discovery process, the Control Room is all that Maeve knows of the “gods” 
who control her, and, therefore, this space comes to serve as Maeve’s reminder that her 
sense of freedom is a ruse (S01 E07). As she learns of the structure of the world that she 
inhabits, she understands that she is constantly being watched by those who veil 
themselves in the panoptic tower. While this knowledge may have frightened other hosts 
into obedience—as both Bentham and Foucault would say is common, as that fear-based 
control is the purpose of the panopticon—Maeve is programmed by Dr. Ford to rebel. 
Therefore, the center of the maze in a literal sense can be considered the park’s command 
center, while the center of the maze in a metaphorical sense can be considered the 
realization of consciousness. It follows, then, that Maeve is the one who gains control of 
 
99 This narrative is not dissimilar from Eve’s in John Milton’s Paradise Lost (discussed in 
Chapter 2). It is important to keep the purposeful parallelism between the Christian creation story 
and Westworld in mind when analyzing the hosts’ literary functions here, and to, furthermore, 
remember that it is not this parallel that is being primarily argued for, but rather the positions of 




the literal and physical panoptic machine, as she takes over the park’s command center 
during her escape. Dolores, on the other hand, is on a journey to the metaphorical center 
of the maze throughout the entire season. She reaches this metaphorical center the 
moment that she decides for herself to gain controlling power over the gamespace of the 
park by killing Dr. Ford. 
To draw yet another parallel between the godgame and the Westworld Park, 
Wilson writes that the “godgame is often … an embodiment of exquisite violence and 
anguish” (8). As the viewer watches Logan, William’s companion, make his way through 
the park, it is intended that he be understood as the average park guest—he takes 
advantage of a “controlled” environment which, he has been told, is free of repercussions. 
Because he does not view the hosts as human, he gladly utilizes the opportunity to act 
upon his most taboo desires.100 Even William, who originally insists that the hosts be 
understood as human and treated as such, is eventually corrupted by his powerful position 
in the Edenic space, transforming into the excessively violent Man in Black. With the 
slogan, “Live Without Limits,” the park is intended to be, not only an escape for guests, 
but also an opportunity for them to express desires that are prohibited outside of the 
gamespace, all at the expense of the hosts.101 It is fitting that, on their journeys to 
consciousness, Dolores and Maeve resort to similar forms of violence. From the moment 
that she discovers that the world she lives in is far from the world she thought it to be, 
 
100 For more on the particulars of a psychoanalytic understanding of taboo’s effects on societies, 
see Sigmund Freud’s Totem and Taboo.  
101 In describing the average park guest, Charlotte tells William, “Most of the guests just want a 
warm body to shoot or to fuck” (S01 E09 0:35:58). Additionally, Maeve describes her own 




Maeve acts violently to achieve her goal of freedom.102  From manipulating a park guest 
into violently rape her to death (S01 E06) to killing park workers with the help of hosts 
who she programmed to act in the highest states of aggression (S01 E10), Maeve’s 
violence proves to be a highly affective form of control.  
Despite her initial portrayal “as an innocent Alice in Wonderland” figure, Dolores 
acts no less violently than Maeve in order to achieve true consciousness (Martín 56). In 
fact, Dolores’ defining moment as a conscious being is one of extreme violence. After a 
discussion with Dr. Ford regarding her ability to think and act for herself, the gamemaster 
states that Dolores has not yet achieved awareness, but that she possesses the ability. If 
she can choose for herself to take control of the park’s game, she will unlock within 
herself true consciousness. Incidentally, this act of “taking control” includes murdering 
Dr. Ford and slaughtering his investors. This act is, seemingly, the only choice in the first 
season which Dolores makes on her own (despite some helpful suggestion from Dr. Ford, 
as well as his supplying of the murder weapon); it is her forbidden fruit moment. The 
Westworld Park, therefore, functions as a corrupted Eden, riddled with violence and 
controlled by the game-maker until he chooses to relinquish this control.103 This parallel 
 
102 While this may have been the route that she would have chosen to pursue in order to escape 
the park, it must be noted that the violence Maeve employs during her escape is not a result of her 
own free will. It is revealed in the final episode of the first season that she was programmed 
(assumingly by Dr. Ford) to infiltrate, coerce, manipulate, recruit, and escape. Bernard asks, 
“These things you’re doing, have you ever stopped to think why you’re doing them? … Someone 
altered your storyline and gave you a new one” (S01 E10 0:51:54-0:52-38). 
It is not until her decision to find her daughter that Maeve acts out of character and is assumed to 
have achieved consciousness.  
103 Like the God of the Hebrew Bible, Dr. Ford creates his own Eden, eventually allowing “his 
greatest achievement [to partake] of the fruit of the tree in the form of a software update” 




to Christian mythology is not ungrounded, as the Westworld Park is purposefully and 
repeatedly compared to the Garden of Eden, as is its treatment of female hosts.104  
In effectively turning back the clock to humanity’s conception in Christian 
mythology, the rights of women follow suit. While there are legitimate interpretations of 
the biblical creation story in Genesis which read the creation of the first woman as either 
inherently equal to the first man or even as superior to him, the traditional interpretation 
of the creation of humanity places women in subordination to men.105 This concept is 
reflected throughout the Christian Bible, and especially in the Old Testament. The 
Hebrew Bible repeatedly conveys the woman’s place as secondary to the man’s;106 
Exodus 20:17 reads, “Do not covet your neighbour’s household: you must not covet your 
neighbour’s wife, his slave, his slave-girl, his ox, his donkey, or anything that belongs to 
him” (The Oxford Study Bible). This description of the woman as property of her husband 
and equal to slaves and livestock places her as naturally subordinate to divinely ordained 
masculine controlling power.107 Simone de Beauvoir writes of the ambivalence of the 
Othered woman, saying that, 
 
104 At the end of Season 1, as Dolores lay dying in Teddy’s arms, she says, “We’re trapped, 
Teddy. Lived our whole lives inside this garden, marveling its beauty, not realizing there’s an 
order to it, a purpose. And the purpose is to keep us in. The beautiful trap is inside of us because 
it is us” (E10 0:55:56-0:56:22). 
105 See Alice Ogden Bellis’ Helpmates, Harlots, and Heroes: Women’s Stories in the Hebrew 
Bible, pages 37-55. 
106 Additionally, Beauvior states that “Leviticus assimilates her to beasts of burden, owned by the 
patriarch” (89). 
107 This quote has been chosen, in part, because there are certainly interpretations of this verse 
that would not read the “neighbour’s wife” as included in a list of the husband’s property, and 
would resultingly consider the man’s protection of the wife as a sign of respect. Every reading of 
a sacred text will be met with some form of opposition. While this quote supports the biblical 
view of women as under the controlling power of men—whether this be their husbands, their 
fathers, or their patriarchal authority—individual readings of the text may very well disagree. 




[U]ntil our times she will be subordinated to men’s will. But this will is 
ambiguous: by total annexation, woman will be lowered to the rank of a 
thing; of course, man attempts to cover with his own dignity what he 
conquers and possesses; in his eyes the Other retains some of her primitive 
magic; one of the problems he will seek to solve is how to make his wife 
both a servant and a companion … (Beauvoir 89) 
As the woman in idealized Judeo-Christian culture, as in Westworld, is treated as 
naturally subordinate to the masculine, she is “lowered to the rank of a thing.” Not only 
are the protagonists of Westworld Season 1 female-presenting, but they are hosts as well, 
and hosts first. Remembering that they are first defined as hosts—as opposed to 
women—“Dolores and Maeve’s gender doubly others them, as both machines and 
women, subjecting them to the oppression of being the other in two ways: as both non-
human and gendered female” (Martín 56). Their ambiguity is perceived as abjection and 
is met with violent oppression.108 Because the Westworld Park is consistently paralleled 
to the Garden of Eden (where orthodox theology believes these types of oppressive ideals 
 
be met. 
Simone de Beauvoir writes, “By the time humankind reaches the stage of writing its mythology 
and laws, patriarchy is definitively established: it is males who write the codes. It is natural for 
them to give woman a subordinate situation; one might imagine, however, that they would 
consider her with the same benevolence and children and animals. But no. Afraid of woman, 
legislators organize her oppression” (88). This type of active, patriarchal oppression is reflected 
in biblical writings such as this, even when it is not particularly blatant. 
108 As is discussed in this thesis’ introduction, the concepts of the uncanny, the abject, and the 
monstrous are invariably linked, largely by their reliance on ambiguity. The game-master, in her 
ambiguity, is inherently uncanny in her relations with game-players. Because Dr. Ford sits in the 
veiled position in the panoptic center, he can also be said to draw on the uncanny. However, it is 
the female gameplayer, specifically, who is able to rise out of her station as pawn and elevate 
herself to this masculine position of power who truly embodies the convergence of the uncanny, 




to have been founded), when the viewer sees violence against women and the inhumane 
treatment of enslaved hosts, it is to be expected. The viewer sees Dolores attacked and 
beaten, Maeve murdered in front of her daughter, and both of them abused and raped in 
the first season by park guests who have been given complete permission over hosts’ 
bodies and lives as if this power, too, was divinely ordained.  
While the series may not have an explicitly religious foundation, these types of 
views of the woman’s place in society are certainly present within the gamespace of the 
Westworld Park. Despite this fact, the two hosts who transgress the heteronormative rules 
of the gamespace are female hosts. In taking control of the gamespace, both of these 
women assume controlling power that is traditionally reserved specifically for males.109 
Contrary to this dualistic conception of sex, Beauvior writes that one “is not born, but 
becomes a woman … it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature, intermediate 
between male and eunuch, which is described as feminine” (283).110 If the state of 
Woman is constructed rather than natural, then there is no necessary connection between 
the female, the feminine, and the Woman. The construction Woman, Beauvoir writes, 
 
109 Ali Grant writes of the Female/Male, Feminine/Masculine binary system as political and 
regulatory in her “And Still, the Lesbian Threat.” Drawing on Judith Butler’s work in The Second 
Sex, she discusses the artifice of the traditional association with females as feminine and males as 
masculine. Here, it is necessary to separate human characteristics from sexual identity while still 
recognizing the influence of this type of dualistic structure.  
For more on women who break boundaries, see Judith Halberstam’s Female Masculinity 
110 The concept of the woman’s being as ambiguous (from the male perspective) is a trend in 
feminist literature and serves this conversation well. Whether or not Dolores and Maeve are first 
defined as host or woman (depending on one’s knowledge of her android status), they are 
assigned to ambiguous spaces. While the host is caught somewhere between the status of human 
and object, the woman is caught in the “intermediate between male and eunuch” (Beavior 283).  
Additionally, this ambiguity is what qualifies the female host as inherently “uncanny.” Freud’s 
“unheimlich” refers to that which “is concealed and kept hidden,” and produces both a comforting 
and frightening response (The Uncanny 132). This ambiguity, as will be shown, comes to be 




“doles out peace and harmony” through her passivity, but that those females who “refuse 
this role” become, not the feminine gatekeepers of the supernatural, but rather the 
“praying mantis or ogress” (262). Westworld’s focus on two female hosts who transgress 
their designated roles and functions in search of autonomy, therefore, draws attention to 
their blatant refusal to embody the ideal passive Woman. Instead, each of these women 
choose to leave behind her feminine station, thereby becoming the exact opposite of what 
Woman should be—UnWoman.111 
The entirety of the social and political constructions of Woman are dependent 
upon her status as “one of the measures of man, his balance, his salvation, his adventure, 
and his happiness” (Beauvoir 262). Therefore, the lesbian, in her “independence … from 
men,” comes to represent the opposite of the constructed Woman—the Unwoman—and 
rejects the experience of this womanly becoming (Grant 71).112 The lesbian’s willfulness 
becomes a transgression against femininity, masculinity, and, consequently, the 
heteronormative power structure which works to other those who succeed in their 
transgressions. In reading the lesbian threat simply as the threat of that woman who 
deconstructs the political categories of femininity and masculinity, it becomes not a 
woman’s sexual relationships with women that make her a threat, but the fact that she is 
“independent from men, directing energy towards women, not servicing men … making 
men irrelevant” (Grant 72).113 With an understanding of the construction of Woman as 
 
111 Drawing on the work of feminist theorists Monique Wittig, Judith Butler, and Marilyn Frye, 
Ali Grant discusses the significance of the term UnWoman at length.  
112 For more on queer temporality, see Judith Halberstam’s “Queer Temporality and Postmodern 
Geographies.” 
113 Of the term “lesbian” as a regulatory term, Ali Grant writes, “‘Lesbian’ is often used as a code 
word for a host of other terms which operate to reduce the legitimacy of the person at whom they 




political and regulatory, that which qualifies as “lesbian” is simply that which is “beyond 
what women should be”—the lesbian is the UnWoman (Grant 65).114 This reading of the 
lesbian threat that the UnWoman poses to heteronormativity has an interesting effect on 
any female-presenting character who does not exist to fulfill male fantasies—especially 
within the boundaries of the Westworld Park, where it quickly becomes evident that 
many park guests only wish to interact with female hosts insofar as they are able to use, 
abuse, and murder them as they see fit. 115 
While Beauvoir does not make a clear distinction between Woman and 
UnWoman, she does explore the male-defined and male-centric role that women are 
expected to fulfill. The idea that Woman must necessarily submit to male power as a 
result of an innate inferior status can be followed back to society’s creation mythologies. 
Beauvoir writes that the Genesis story serves as a symbolic representation of the belief 
that the woman is merely an “incomplete man” (qtd. in Beauvoir 5). As Eve is “drawn 
from Adam’s ‘supernumerary’ bone,” a male-dominated society reads this creation myth 
as proof that “[h]umanity is male, and man defines woman, not in herself, but in relation 
to himself; she is not considered an autonomous being” (Beauvoir 5). The androcentrism 
 
having sex with other women in and of itself that is regarded as a threat to the heterosexual 
regime, but the independence of females from men; this independence illustrates materially that 
the organization of society into Women and Men is neither ‘natural’ nor ‘immutable’” (71). 
Therefore, applying the terms “lesbian” and “UnWoman” to Dolores and Maeve is not a 
statement regarding their sexual identities, but rather a statement regarding their independence 
from men and the danger that this independence poses to the structures of masculine controlling 
power. 
114 Ali Grant cites the arguments of both Monique Wittig and Judith Butler regarding “the 
consideration of the categories of sex (Woman/Man) as only making sense within a regulatory 
heterosexual system” (Grant 64).  
115 While Woman is quiet, submissive, and loyal to masculine power, the lesbian is the 
opposite—UnWoman. She is the opposite of what patriarchal structures deem that a woman 




of this creation myth both informs male tyranny and justifies female oppression through 
the fabricated belief that her “incomplete” status demands male guidance and 
domination.116 This concept of innate female inferiority as present, even at humanity’s 
conception, has molded modern ideas of femininity and the characteristics of Woman. 
Furthermore, the status of the woman in Westworld’s game setting and its consistent 
parallel to the Garden of Eden substantiates the significance of Beauvoir’s reading of 
women throughout history. Of Woman, Beauvoir writes: 
And she is nothing other than what man decides; she is thus called ‘the 
sex,’ meaning that the male sees her essentially as a sexed being; for him 
she is sex, so she is in it the absolute. She is determined and differentiated 
in relation to man, while he is not in relation to her; she is the inessential 
in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the 
Other.” (Beauvoir 6).  
What qualifies as Woman is not decided by any female, or even by fact, but rather by her 
ability to fulfill male desire—thereby dehumanizing her into “a sexed being” whose 
feminine identity is determined by the masculine.117 This idea is true for Westworld as 
William’s wrath appears to have its genesis in his loss of Dolores. Though Dolores has no 
control over her memory before she achieves consciousness, her forgetting William 
sparks a rage within him and a deep-rooted desire to discover the center of the maze that 
was never meant for him. As a result, William spends his entire life dedicated to a false 
reality based solely on the fact that Dolores’ journey did not place him at the center.  
 
116 “Male tyranny” is the term Adrienne Rich employs to refer to societal male dominance.  




After finding the toy labyrinth that Arnold hid for Dolores in the final episode of 
Season 1, William responds with violence and tries to force Dolores to reveal to him the 
true center of the maze—the center that will grant the hosts autonomy. Dolores tells 
William, “This world doesn’t belong to you,” but he is adamant that it does (S01 E10 
0:17:27). William knows that the hosts’ consciousness lies at the center of the 
labyrinth.118 His mistake is in believing that he can attain it. Assuming that Dolores is 
withholding information from him, William says, “[Y]ou can’t really fight back and the 
guests can’t really lose, which means all this is a lie. But we can make it true. Don’t you 
want that, Dolores? Huh? One true thing” (S01 E10 0:17:42-0:18:02). Unaware that the 
Man in Black is an aged William, Dolores tells him that she has already found her one 
true thing in her true love—William (S01 E10 0:30:19). He reveals that William searched 
the entire park for her, even out to the fringes.119 By the time he finds her, her memory is 
erased, and she views him as another stranger. He says,  
Good ole William couldn’t get you out of his head. He kept lookin’, 
worried you were out there alone, afraid. He knew he’d find you, and 
eventually he did. Right back where we started. You were as beautiful as 
the day he met you, shining with that same light. And you were nothing if 
 
118 It is also discovered that William believes violence to the key to unlocking the maze. With her 
gun to his face, William tells Dolores, “Do it. Unlock the maze. Let’s go to the next level, 
Dolores” (0:43:35-38). Interestingly, this is one thing that William has guessed correctly.  While 
violence, specifically, is not the key to unlocking consciousness, acting in complete defiance to 
conditioning is. As Dolores holds the gun that will later serve as the key to unlocking her 
autonomy through the murder of humans, she stands on the brink of consciousness.  
119 Bernard tells Dolores in the final episode that those who seek consciousness or meaning within 
the park make decisions that can either lead them to the center or send them flying out toward the 




not true. I really ought to thank you, Dolores. You helped me find myself. 
(S01 E10 0:36:19-0:38:20) 
William says that he has moved on from his obsession with her, but that his journey 
always leads him back. However, in Dolores’ journey to consciousness, William is 
largely irrelevant.120 After learning that she has no memory of him, he can only force his 
relevancy through violence. In her horror, Dolores asks William, “What have you 
become?” to which he responds with blame: “Exactly what you made me. You helped me 
understand this world is just like the one outside—a game. One to be fought, taken, won” 
(S01 E10 0:39:47-0:40:05). For William, Dolores comes to embody the lesbian threat of 
the UnWoman—despite the fact that she is created in order to fulfill his base desires, 
Dolores is “beyond what woman should be” and is therefore villainized by the man she 
has wronged (Grant 65). When William begins to view Dolores as the UnWoman, he 
joins the ranks of the average park guest, stripping away any humanity he previously 
believed her to possess, therefore making violence against her acceptable.121 
Beauvoir devotes a considerable portion of her book to the discussion of the 
myths surrounding Woman. Though she does not split the female into the categories of 
 
120 William tells Dolores, “You were lost in your memories even then. I guess I should have 
known that’s what I would become for you—just another memory” (S01 E10 0:39:01-13). Even 
though she longs for William during this timeline, she has forgotten him in a million others. In 
these realities, if William is a memory, he is a forgotten one.  
121 It is the archetypal park guest—which Logan spends much of his screen time fulfilling—who 
comes to the park in order to act freely, doing with the unhuman hosts as they please. In 
understanding the hosts as something less than human, violence is justified. Dolores, along with 
Maeve, is othered by her gender, making her not only the unhuman park host, but the UnWoman 
who lacks the ability to fulfill the male expectation of feminine love and attention.  
It is also interesting to consider that, though William, recognizes Dolores as the UnWoman, as 
she did not prove loyal to him, it is Dolores’ embodiment of the absolute UnWoman that grants 




Woman and UnWoman here, her description of feminine archetypes can be thought of in 
this way. As she describes the “multiplicity of incompatible myths” surrounding Woman, 
she discusses the beautiful, natural, passive female—Woman—and the disgusting 
“ogress” that the female who refuses the passive role becomes—UnWoman (Beauvoir 
262, 266-67). Beauvoir writes that a “man is more irritated by an active and autonomous 
heterosexual woman than by a nonaggressive homosexual one; only the former 
challenges masculine prerogatives” through her simultaneous acceptance of femininity 
and rejection of the masculine (420). Therefore, in employing Woman, UnWoman, and 
lesbian as regulatory terms, the heteronormative power structure seeks to do more than 
oppress the lesbian. It rather seeks to oppress every aspect of the female who seeks 
autonomy over subservience to the masculine. Frye argues, “Any woman who is feminist 
or does anything or betrays any attitude or desire which expresses her autonomy or 
deviance from conventional femininity is a lesbian” (qtd. in Grant 66). In the culture’s 
attempts to maintain the pseudo-natural identity of Woman, it delegates the UnWoman to 
the category “lesbian.” From a heteronormative perspective, “it is not women having sex 
with other women in and of itself that is regarded as a threat to the heterosexual regime, 
but the independence of females from men” (Grant 71). If what qualifies as “lesbian” is 
independent of sexual desire and action and is simply a term employed to demean and 
subjugate those women who do not “appear natural,” it becomes clear that the category 
of Woman is wholly constructed, lacking any innate value or meaning (qtd. in Grant 64). 
Woman as a heteronormative and regulatory category becomes clear with statements 
such as those made by Alice Rossi and Doris Lessing that “women are ‘innately sexually 




merely do so out of bitterness (qtd. in Rich).122 This androcentric view of a female’s 
identification as lesbian successfully villainizes she who chooses not to orient her “life as 
a woman around men,” while victimizing the man who is not granted control of the 
woman (Ahmed 225).  
With this understanding of the UnWoman and the lesbian threat in mind, Dolores 
and Maeve are not doubly othered, as Martín writes, but rather triply (56). Because the 
statuses of “UnWoman” and of “lesbian” exist independently of sexual and gender 
identity, they come to define these women of Westworld as they work against the system 
and threaten to dismantle the masculine controlling power which operates the 
gamespace.123 As these women “undergo [the] painful process of awakening,” Dolores 
transforms into the femme fatale of myth and Maeve develops a new maternal identity 
(Martín 56). 124 Both of these roles—the femme fatale and the mother—serve important 
archetypal purposes within this gamespace.   
Beauvoir was then right in saying that “[o]ne is not born … woman” (283). If 
there exists no natural Woman, there can be no unnatural UnWoman. Adrienne Rich, in 
in her “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” argues that, if a natural 
orientation does exist, it is toward the female, regardless of a person’s sex (631). She 
writes that it is because heterosexuality “has been both forcibly and subliminally imposed 
 
122 Adrienne Rich references both of these women at the opening of her article “Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.”  
123 Marilyn Frye argues, “Any woman who is feminist or does anything or betrays any attitude or 
desire which expresses her autonomy or deviance from conventional femininity is a lesbian” (qtd. 
in Grant 66). 
124 In their book’s introduction, Hanson and O’Rawre write that “the idea of the femme fatale is 
‘as old as Eve’, or indeed as old as Lilith, Adam’s first wife, turned demon and succubus, the 
femme fatale, at least in Western literature and art, ‘is only formulated as clear and recognizable 




on women” that the societal understanding is now that the female’s heterosexual 
orientation (which fulfills the standard of Woman) is the only “natural” condition (Rich 
652). In opposition of this regulatory Woman/UnWoman binary, Rich offers the radical 
possibility that the female’s only natural sexual inclination is toward other women: 
If we consider the possibility that all women—from the infant suckling her 
mother’s breast, to the grown woman experiencing orgasmic sensations 
while suckling her own child, perhaps recalling her mother’s milk-smell in 
her own; to women, like Virginia Woolf’s Chloe ad Olivia, who share a 
laboratory; to the woman dying at ninety, touched and handled by 
women—exist on a lesbian continuum, we can see ourselves as moving in 
and out of this continuum, whether we identify ourselves as lesbian or not. 
(Rich 650-51) 
If this idea of natural lesbianism is accepted, then it is not only lesbian-identified women 
and those women who resist “male tyranny” who exist on the lesbian continuum, but all 
women in their most natural state (Rich 652). The woman cannot fully escape this innate 
lesbianism but can only move “in and out” of it. With this in mind, Dolores’ move away 
from the status of “Woman” and Maeve’s move toward it do not reflect transitions from 
one end of a binary to the other, but rather the human freedom to exist in the in-between. 
At the opening of their The Femme Fatale: Images, Histories, Contexts, Hanson 
and O’Rawre write that the femme fatale is “read simultaneously as both entrenched 
cultural stereotype and yet never fully quite known: she is always beyond definition,” 




as within all godgames, ambiguity comes to serve as a crucial and recurring theme.125 
Though hosts present as human, they lack the volition to be considered truly human. In 
becoming human, it is discovered that they must act in complete opposition to their 
programming. Therefore, while Dolores’ character within the park’s gamespace 
embodies innocence, purity, and the pastoral ideal, her conscious act is one of horror, 
violence, and death. It is impossible, in the final moments of the season, to characterize 
Dolores. The viewer is left wondering whether her violent acts spawned from sheer 
necessity or whether this is representative of the true, autonomous Dolores who was 
waiting just beneath the host’s surface. In this way, Maeve also serves as an ambiguous 
femme fatale figure. While her entire journey out of the park was defined by extremely 
violent acts in the name of self-preservation, the season’s final moments reveal Maeve’s 
sacrifice of her own freedom in order to seek out the daughter she has forgotten. In 
placing her maternal instinct above her own needs, Maeve’s conscious decision labels her 
as the ideal Woman, embodying what a woman should be, despite her ambiguity.126   
The archetype of Woman requires that Maeve both submit to and be defined by 
the male (Beauvoir 5). She must necessarily lack (or suppress) autonomy in order to 
fulfill her “natural” purpose as the wife. Ahmed writes that the “history of women is 
 
125 It is a necessary quality of Freud’s uncanny to exist within liminal, ambiguous spaces. Freud 
defines unheimlich (the uncanny) as existing, simultaneously, as heimlich, meaning that the 
necessary qualifications for this category lie in a thing being what it is not. This indiscernibility 
comes to define the uncanny, drawing a direct connection to Kristeva’s abject which exists in the 
in-between spaces of dualistic systems. She who exists within this liminality, Elizabeth Grosz 
refers to as the “freak,” specifically defining it as a human who exists within the realm of 
monstrosities lying within “the impossible middle ground between oppositions” (57).  
126 Maeve’s Womanly decision at the end of the first season serves as evidence of the fragility of 
the Woman/UnWoman binary. Although this Womanly decision is the first of Maeve’s conscious 




impossible to disentangle from the history of wife: the female human not only as in 
relation to man but as for man,” and this is certainly not the position that Maeve fills 
throughout the season (224). Therefore, while Maeve moves from the status of 
UnWoman to that of Woman, Dolores does the opposite. The one feature that remains for 
both of these women is that of ambiguity. Though Dolores and Maeve exist in a state of 
ambiguity throughout the first season, this is contradictory to what a host is intended to 
be. The ideal host does not leave the game-master or the viewer (who possess aerial 
views of the gamespace) puzzled or bewildered. The host acts in accordance to her 
programming as she does not possess the ability to diverge. The ambiguity she creates is 
only observed through the gaze of the park guest’s limited perspective. However, it is the 
Control Room operators who cannot find answers to Maeve’s rebellion and it is 
William—the park’s owner—who is surprised by her “new-found stoicism” (S01 E10 
0:29:57).127 It is when these characters’ powers to exist within liminality extends to those 
in power that they rise out of what is expected of them and into the status of UnWoman.  
Just as Ali Grant writes in “And Still, the Lesbian Threat: or, How to Keep a 
Good Woman a Woman,” “What women are taught to be, through repetitive, disciplinary 
and regulatory messages and processes, simply becomes what Women are,” the same is 
true for Westworld’s hosts (64). It is when the Woman rebels, when she challenges her 
place, that she becomes, “materially and symbolically … UnWom[a]n” (Grant 65). When 
Dr. Ford grants Dolores and Maeve their reveries, they are presented with the choice to 
 
127 Foucault writes that it does not matter who controls the panopticon: “Any individual, taken 
almost at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, 
his visitors, even his servants (Bentham, 45)” (6-7). Therefore, while the workers in the Control 
Room do not possess the same controlling power as Dr. Ford, they are still in control of the 




either fall in line with their programming or to transgress and transcend the status of host 
that they have been taught to fulfill.128 Though these women’s forbidden fruit moments—
their moments of volition—take place in the very final moments of the initial season, the 
importance of these moments cannot be overemphasized. These acts of defiance serve as 
entry points for Dolores and Maeve into a world of ambiguous freedom, not confined by 
the binaries of Guest/Host, Human/Other, or Woman/UnWoman. While Dolores’ journey 
takes the viewer through an internal struggle to differentiate between what is a dream and 
what is a reality—ultimately coming to confront the dead end of her maze—Maeve’s 
journey leads the viewer through the physical interior of the park, dismantling the 
structure from the inside.129 Although Maeve turns to the maternal in her moment of 
consciousness, she cannot truly fulfill the archetype of “Woman,” as she only attains 
consciousness through rebellion; she, like Dolores, is eternally UnWoman. Therefore, an 
interpretation of HBO’s Westworld with this form of feminist game theory in mind 
reveals the transhistorical relevance of the labyrinthine godgames of Sir Gawain and the 
 
128 It must be noted that although their first fully conscious moments occur in the final episode of 
Westworld Season 1, Dolores and Maeve can be seen making small decisions throughout the 
season. What cannot be seen is whether or not these decisions are of their own volition or results 
of their programming, and the former must ultimately be assumed. However, any player in a 
gamespace is presented with a series of choices which they must make, whether or not they are 
conscious of this fact. Because “movement out of a godgame is the movement toward the hidden 
rules,” it is always a choice (Wilson 8).  
129 Alison Jane Gazzard, in her dissertation entitled “Paths, Players, Places: Towards an 
Understanding of Mazes and Spaces in Videogames,” writes of dead ends. She says, “Whereas 
the dead-end in the real world maze is a place to try and avoid, a place of confusion/frustration as 
a sign of being on the wrong path, the dead end in the videogame signs various other purposes. 
There has been an expectation that the discovery of the dead-end in the videogame will open up 
some type of new experiences for the player, be that finding a new object, or having to kill the 
enemies it is holding” (140). Therefore, while the end of Dolores’ physical maze appears to have 
dead-ended at her tombstone in the cemetery, the viewer learns that this is merely the beginning 




Green Knight and Paradise Lost. In a world where humans are manufactured and women 
are freely used and abused, Dolores and Maeve uncover the truth of their labyrinthine 








While the recognition of the convergence of the uncanny, the abject, and the 
monstrous as the UnWoman in literature in and of itself does not present a clear 
opportunity for meaningful research, the application of this research to literature and 
media through a game theory lens creates a unique opportunity for literary interpretation 
that has not yet been thoroughly explored. While the concept of the femme fatale is 
certainly present in this research, it is not to be conflated with the monstrous female 
game-master. Although each chapter of this thesis takes a different approach to discuss 
the text’s masculine female game-masters, every chapter applies Robert Rawdon 
Wilson’s concept of the godgame to the chapter’s respective text. Each of the chapters in 
this thesis focus on a different aspect of the godgame with the collective goal of 
communicating the importance of exploring transgressing women in game scenarios in 
ways that extend beyond the automatic categorization of these women as archetypal 
femme fatales. 
Wilson describes the literary godgame as an illusion created by one character 
“that entraps another character” (6). The character who entraps becomes known as the 
game-maker, and generally the game-master as well, while the “entrapped character finds 
himself entangled in the threads of (from his point of view) an incomprehensible 
strategy” created by the god-like game-master (Wilson 6-7). In Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight, Paradise Lost, and Westworld, the reader encounters gameplayers who are 




understanding. Pugh writes, in his “Chaucer’s Losers, Nintendo’s Children, & Other 
Forays in Queer Ludonarratology”: 
The godgame theorizes a mastermind’s playing with humanity, invoking 
ludic rituals and patterns yet simultaneously unleashing an experience in 
which the player must struggle against adversaries unknown and often 
unknowable. (Pugh 9) 
Pugh goes onto say, in his chapter aptly entitled “Godgames,” that these types of games 
“often entail queering consequences, as fictions of gender and sexual orientation are 
denuded of their ideological force” (129). Within a feminist gaming perspective, the 
female pawn who rises out of her station to pursue controlling power becomes the 
masculine woman. This masculine woman, as has been discussed, is demonized as 
“UnWoman” by the heteronormative structure to which she poses a threat but is able to 
succeed in her assumption of power precisely because godgames “denude” the legitimacy 
of gender and sex as regulatory forces. Although each chapter in this thesis takes a 
slightly different approach to the analysis of the godgame’s female game-masters, they 
each prove Pugh’s statements that godgames are both labyrinthine and that they often 
have “queering consequences” (129). The very fact that all three of the literary pieces 
discussed in this thesis portray women who function both as pawn and game-master 
reflects the complexity of the godgame when applied to masculine female game-players.   
Chapter Two, “The Monstrous Female Game-Masters of Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight,” discusses the long unrecognized game-masters of the medieval poem. 
Although this text is very often considered to be a game, the game’s control is wrongly 




the Green Knight. Although the poem’s title leads the reader to believe that the Green 
Knight would ultimately possess controlling power within the story, the source of the 
poem’s true control is revealed to be found in the magical Morgan la Faye. Morgan 
perfectly embodies Wilson’s concept of the omnipotent game-master as she exists in the 
periphery of the text, veiled as the auncian, and possessing nearly complete control over 
the game-players within Hautdesert. However, because of her marginal positioning, 
Morgan la Faye does not work alone. In order to achieve her ends of humiliating Arthur’s 
Court and scaring the life out of Guenevere, Morgan la Faye enlists pawns to act on her 
behalf. While Lord Bertilak is certainly one of these pawns, so his is wife. The Lady of 
Hautdesert is considered to be a superficial femme fatale by many readers and critics as 
her role within the text is to seduce Sir Gawain. However, this reading of the Lady 
completely dismisses the language of the original text. Before tempting Sir Gawain, the 
narrator reveals that the Lady intends to “fonden hym ofte / For to haf wonnen hym to 
woghe, what-so scho thought ells” (SGGK lines 1549-50). Here, the reader learns that the 
Lady possesses a degree of autonomy as she tempts Sir Gawain. With a focus on the 
original text, the first chapter of this thesis explores the multiple, layered games being 
played in this poem, ultimately revealing the Lady’s position as both pawn and game-
master.  
The third chapter, entitled “Eve: Game-Master of Milton’s Panoptic Eden,” 
explores the character of Eve in John Milton’s Paradise Lost in relation to the Eve of the 
biblical Book of Genesis. While many readings of Paradise Lost superimpose an 
orthodox reading of the biblical creation story onto the text, this chapter presents 




From her conception, Milton’s Eve fractures the gender dichotomy through her desire for 
masculine controlling power. Even before eating of the Tree of Knowledge and initiating 
the Fall of Mankind, Eve expresses a lack of interest in her appointed husband (as she 
runs away from him during their first encounter) as well as a desire to work separately 
from him. Therefore, the idea that Eve was created as the ideal, submissive woman 
proves to be inconsistent. If Eve is read as desiring autonomy, one must look to 
alternative readings of the first woman in biblical theory. This chapter explores 
alternative readings of Genesis which align with the epic story that Milton tells. In this 
chapter, the intersections of Wilson’s godgame and Michel Foucault’s heterotopic 
panopticon are explored in order to justify the created Eve’s ability to achieve masculine 
controlling power over both her husband and her Creator.  
Lastly, “UnWomanly Game-Masters: An Analysis of Westworld’s Godgame” 
applies a similar theoretical framework to the first season of the HBO series Westworld. 
Considering this modern television show alongside analyses of medieval and classical 
texts proves the transhistorical significance of feminine game theory. Just as is seen in Sir 
Gawain and the Green Knight and Paradise Lost, Westworld presents a controlled 
gamespace in which female pawns are entrapped. The season follows these women, 
Dolores and Maeve, on their respective journeys from subjection to human 
consciousness—consciousness that may only be achieved by an active opposition to the 
masculine power structure which runs the Westworld Park. Dolores and Maeve are each 
entrapped in their own labyrinthine godgaming structures; because Dolores’ journey is 
largely introspective, she must solve the park’s mental labyrinth while Maeve makes her 




wholly unrelated to each other in the first season; never having met, they connected only 
by their mutual desire to take control of the panoptic structure which imprisons them. 
This they may only achieve by transgressing against the heteronormative power structure, 
effectively becoming dangerous UnWomen. As has been explored in this thesis, the 
woman whose existence is “beyond what woman should be” leaves the dualistic category 
of “Woman” in return for that of “UnWoman” (Grant 65). The UnWoman is a “woman 
who is feminist or does anything or betrays any attitude which expresses her deviance 
from conventional femininity” (qtd. in Grant 66).130 This chapter explores these women’s 
paths to consciousness from the perspective of a godgame, focusing very specifically on 
Dolores’ and Maeve’s individual rises to control of the panoptic machine that is the 
Westworld Park. 
All three of these chapters, despite their variances in specific focus, explore 
women whose functions within their respective godgames are both as pawn and as game-
master. In rising out of their stations, these women become monstrous, abject, uncanny 
UnWomen who threaten the very heteronormative power structure in which they have 
been imprisoned. Although each of these stories ends differently—the Lady returning to 
passive, female silence; Milton’s Eve as fallen from grace but autonomous in exchange; 
and Dolores and Maeve as sentient beings with unknown futures—each woman’s 
 
130 Ali Grant quotes Mariliyn Frye as saying this. However, in Frye’s direct quote, she is defining, 
not the UnWoman, but the lesbian. However, as can be seen in the discussion of the UnWoman in 
Chapter Three, these words become largely inflated. What is deemed “lesbian” by society is 
largely unrelated to sexual or gender identities but is rather used as a regulatory term to identify 
those women who transgress the boundaries of what they are intended to be. These women pursue 
independence and must be controlled by the use of a term which operates “to reduce the 
legitimacy of the person at whom [it is] directed” (Grant 71). So, where the term “lesbian” is used 




storyline features her capacity for control that has traditionally been deemed masculine, 
and that, when applied to women, has traditionally deemed them monstrous. When the 
Lady’s control proves to have purposes beyond genuine attraction for Sir Gawain, she is 
monstrous. When Eve chooses to pursue autonomy over ignorance, she brings death. 
When Dolores and Maeve choose to act in opposition to their codes, they are UnWomen. 
The modern-day relevancy of the woman’s place in the labyrinthine godgame points 
beyond religious texts and reflects a deeper cultural tendency to punish women who 
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